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INTRODUCTION
Jurors in criminal cases occasionally "nullify" the law by ac-
quitting defendants who they believe are guilty according to the
instructions given to them in court.1 American juries have exer-
cised this unreviewable nullification power to acquit defendants
who face sentences that jurors view as too harsh, who have been
subjected to what jurors consider to be unconscionable govern-
mental action, who have engaged in conduct that jurors do not
believe is culpable, or who have harmed victims whom jurors con-
sider unworthy of protection.2 Recent reports suggest jurors today
are balking in trials in which a conviction could trigger a "three
strikes" or other mandatory sentence, and in "assisted suicide,"
drug possession, and firearms cases.3 Race-based nullification is
f Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. I owe thanks to many colleagues for help
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sistance provided by Randall Butterfield, Cheryl Johnson, and Courtney Persons, and by
the staff of the Vanderbilt University Law Library.
1 Professor Peter Westen has aptly described jury nullification as acquitting "against
the evidence" rather than "on the evidence." Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double
Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 Mich L Rev 1001,
1012 (1980). The frequency of nullification is unknown, but most commentators agree that
it rarely occurs. See Harry Kalven, Jr. and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury 56-57, 116
(Chicago 1971) (providing data that indicates judges attribute to nullification only about 4
percent ofjury acquittals in criminal cases in which the judge would have convicted). See
also Roger Parloff, Race and Juries: If It Ain't Broke .... Am Law 5, 5 (June 1997) (re-
porting acquittal and hung jury rates for several jurisdictions). Compare Clay S. Conrad,
Jury Nullification as a Defense Strategy, 2 Tex Forum Civ Lib & Civ Rts 1, 26-33 (1995)
(collecting many recent examples of nullification).
2 See Kalven and Zeisel, The American Jury at chs 20-27 (concluding that jurors nul-
lify where they believe the defendant has been punished enough, where the punishment
threatened is too severe, where the state has given a codefendant preferential treatment,
where the police or the prosecution have acted improperly, where the defendant's conduct
was inadvertent, where the defendant was insane or intoxicated at the time of the offense,
or where the defendant or victim is a member of a particular group or subculture).
See, for example, Gail Diane Cox, Jurors Rise up over Principle and Their Perks,
Natl L JAl (May 29, 1996) (reporting that jurors in a recent San Francisco case refused to
continue deliberations when they learned the defendant would be subject to the "three
strikes" law); Aaron T. Oliver, Jury Nullification: Should the Type of Case Matter?, 6 Kan
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also a topic of current interest.4
A renaissance of academic support for jury nullification5 has
coincided with increased visibility of the Fully Informed Jury As-
sociation ("FIJA"), a national, nonprofit organization devoted to
promoting jury nullification. A wide assortment of people who
disagree with or distrust some aspect of the criminal law or its
enforcement support FIJA, from AIDS activists to motorcyclists
against mandatory helmet laws.' FIJA reaches potential jurors
with its message of jury power through its newsletter, website,
and handbills distributed at courthouses.7 This pro-nullification
J L & Pub Pol 49, 54-64 (Winter 1997) (describing cases in which jurors may be nullifying
today); Jack B. Weinstein, The Many Dimensions of Jury Nullification, Judicature (forth-
coming 1998) (relating examples).
' See, for example, Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the
Criminal Justice System, 105 Yale L J 677, 679 (1995) (arguing that "for pragmatic and
political reasons, the black community is better off when some nonviolent lawbreakers
remain in the community rather than go to prison); Gerald A. Reynolds, ed, Race and the
Criminal Justice System: How Race Affects Jury Trials (Center for Equal Opportunity
1996).
' See, for example, Jeffrey Abramson, We, the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of
Democracy (BasicBooks 1994) (devoting an entire chapter, titled Juries and Higher Jus-
tice, to nullification); David C. Brody, Sparf and Dougherty Revisited: Why the Court
Should Instruct the Jury of its Nullification Right, 33 Am Crim L Rev 89, 106-22 (1995);
Butler, 105 Yale L J at 679 (arguing that "it is the moral responsibility of black jurors to
emancipate some guilty black outlaws"); David N. Dorfinan and Chris K. Iijima, Fictions,
Fault, and Forgiveness: Jury Nullification in a New Context, 28 U Mich J L Reform 861,
865 (1995) (arguing that authorizing a nullification instruction to the jury would provide
"a more rational basis for jury deliberation and decision making" and empower "communi-
ties whose members are increasingly estranged from the criminal justice system's deci-
sion-making process"); Robert F. Schopp, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and Neces-
sity as Jury Responses to Crimes of Conscience, 69 S Cal L Rev 2039, 2041 (1996) (exam-
ining the "appropriate roles for jury nullification and the necessity defense as jury re-
sponses to crimes of conscience"); Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury "Nullification':
When, May, and Should a Jury Reject the Law to Do Justice, 30 Am Crim L Rev 239, 244-
45 (1993) (arguing that "Inlullification arising from idealism is good for the American
soul"). See also Richard St. John, Note, License to Nullify: The Democratic and Constitu-
tional Deficiencies of Authorized Jury Lawmaking, 106 Yale L J 2563, 2564 nn 7-8 (1997)
(collecting recent commentary).
' FIJA members include constitutionalists, people opposed to and supportive of abor-
tion rights, and advocates of such diverse causes as sentencing reform, free speech, the
right to bear arms, alternative medicine, the medicinal use of marijuana, the decriminali-
zation of prostitution, the right to die, freedom of religion, and civil rights generally. See
Alexander Cockburn, FIJA and Freedoms: Fully Informed Jury Association, The Nation 81
(July 17-24, 1995); Stephen J. Adler, Courtroom Putsch?: Jurors Should Reject Laws They
Don't Like, Activist Group Argues, Wall St J Al (Jan 4, 1991).
See, for example, <http'//www.fija.org>; Larry Dodge, State News: FIJA Action Re-
ports and Announcements from Around the U.S., 9:1 FIJActivist 4, 6, 8, 16 (Summer
1997) (describing leaflet distribution at courthouses in Dade County, Florida; Phelps
County, Missouri; and Green Bay, Wisconsin); Larry Dodge, State News: News and Com-
mentary from the Frontlines of the FIJA Movement, 8:4 FIJActivist 4, 7 (Winter/Spring
1997) (reporting leafleting in Indiana and Texas); Don Doig, State News: News and Com-
mentary from the Frontlines of the FIJA Movement, 8:2 FIJActivist 4, 4 (Autumn 1996)
(reporting regular leafleting of state and federal courthouses in Broward County, Florida;
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activity has prompted some critics to call for the judicial review of
acquittals and tighter limits on evidence and argument that
might encourage juries to exercise a leniency the letter of the law
does not allow.' But judges who seek to control nullification today
must not only rein in defense counsel; they must also confront
nullification's new advocates-leafleters and the jurors them-
selves.
They are doing just that. Prosecutors and trial judges un-
happy about nullification advocacy are pursuing charges of con-
tempt, obstruction, or tampering against those who target poten-
tial jurors with nullification propaganda? Venirepersons who
admit during voir dire that they were exposed to nullification ad-
vocacy or who express doubts about or disagreement with the
criminal law or its enforcement are being excluded from jury
service with challenges for cause.'0 Jurors exposed as holdouts or
advocates of nullification in the jury room are being dismissed,
replaced, and sometimes prosecuted." The Second Circuit Court
of Appeals recently declared that trial judges have the duty to
dismiss jurors who intend to nullify. 2 One state judge published a
virtual "how to" guide for other trial judges who wish to suppress
nullification advocacy in their courthouses. 3
Advocates of jury power have questioned whether these re-
sponses can withstand constitutional attack. 4 In this Article, I
Linn County, Iowa; Greene County, Missouri; Monmouth County, New Jersey; and six
county courthouses in New York).
" See Thomas M. DiBiagio, Judicial Equity: An Argument for Post-Acquittal Retrial
When the Judicial Process is Fundamentally Defective, 46 Cath U L Rev 77, 79 (1996)
(proposing appellate review of acquittals for plain error of law, jury and witness intimida-
tion or tampering, or misconduct by defense counsel); Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury
Nullification, 82 Va L Rev 253, 311-23 (1996) (proposing that legislatures establish a
"nullification defense," allowing juries under certain circumstances to acquit despite evi-
dence of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, but at the same time authorizing certain "error-
correcting procedures," including appeals from acquittals); Steven M. Warshawsky, Note,
Opposing Jury Nullification: Law, Policy, and Prosecutorial Strategy, 85 Georgetown L J
191, 194 (1996) (terming renewed legislative interest in nullification "alarming").
See notes 215-21 and accompanying text.
10 See notes 19-28 and accompanying text.
" See notes 33-42 and accompanying text.
United States v Thomas, 116 F3d 606, 617 (2d Cir 1997). See also Benjamin Weiser,
U.S. Court Orders Judges to Step in When Jurors Balk, NY Times Al (May 21, 1997); Edi-
torial, When Jurors Ignore the Law, NY Times A16 (May 21, 1997).
' See Frederic B. Rodgers, The Jury in Revolt? A "Heads Up" on the Fully Informed
Jury Association Coming Soon to a Courthouse in Your Area, 35:3 Judge's J 10 (Summer
1996) (warning that 'judges must now be vigilant during voir dire to ascertain this influ-
ence [of jury nullification propaganda]"). See also Lawrence W. Crisp, et al, Jury Nullifica-
tion: Law Versus Anarchy, 31 Loyola LA L Rev 1, 52-57 (1997) (suggesting techniques).
" See, for example, Brief for Appellant at 8, People v Kriho, No 97-CA-700, Colo Ct
App (Sept 15, 1997), ("A government which can cull from juries all those willing to ques-
tion authority and resist oppression, is a government without restraint.... a tyranny ...
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conclude that they can. 5 Any assessment of the constitutionality
of the nullification controls addressed here requires an under-
standing of the decisions that presently provide the jury with its
ability to veto convictions in criminal cases, decisions such as
those barring the appeal of a jury acquittal or prohibiting a judge
from directing a verdict of guilt. An explanation of the constitu-
tional values protected by such rules may also help to resolve on-
going debates about other nullification controls that, like the
midtrial dismissal of a nullifying juror, have not yet been ad-
dressed directly by the Supreme Court.16 Surprisingly, there is no
[A] jury gutted of independent thinkers, is unconstitutional."); Jury Rights and Responsi-
bilities, CSPAN2 television broadcast from Georgetown University (Mar 31, 1997) ("Rights
and Responsibilities") (comments of Paul Grant and the Honorable Jack B. Weinstein)
(arguing that such exclusions are "subversive of the jury system"); Patricia Michl Re-
sponds to Judge Rodgers'ABA Article, 9:1 FIJActivist 21 (Summer 1997) (arguing that
rigging a jury with "no dissenters against the government7 is no different than rigging "a
southern jury with no black people").
' A few commentators have discussed the potential relationship between the jury's
power of nullification and the ability of judges to exclude nullifiers from juries, but have
not fully explained why the Constitution might permit some restrictions on nullification
but prohibit others. Professor Akhil Reed Amar has proposed that jurors should be ex-
cused only when they would be subject to disqualification if they were serving as judges,
on the basis of his theory that judges and juries serve the same lawmaking function. Akhil
Reed Amar, Reinventing Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 UC Davis L Rev 1169, 1181
(1995). Professor Stanton D. Krauss has repeatedly observed that nullification seems in-
consistent with death-qualification. Stanton D. Krauss, Representing the Community: A
Look at the Selection Process in Obscenity Cases and Capital Sentencing, 64 Ind L J 617,
631 n 64 (1989); Stanton D. Krauss, The Witherspoon Doctrine at Witt's End: Death-
Qualification Reexamined, 24 Am Crim L Rev 1, 56 n 231, 57 (1987) (noting inconsistency
between the process of death-qualifying a jury and nullification and asking, "[wihy should
the State be allowed to engage in this form of gerrymandering?"); Stanton D. Krauss,
Death-Qualification After Wainwright v. Witt: The Issues in Gray v. Mississippi, 65 Wash
U L Q 507, 509 n 12 (1987). Professor Peter Westen also has remarked in passing that al-
though "jurors have a constitutionally protected prerogative to acquit against the evi-
dence," it does not follow that "they must be subject to voir dire in such a light. Westen,
78 Mich L Rev at 1017 n 58 (cited in note 1). Another discussion of the problem appears in
a student note. See Chaya Weinberg-Brodt, Note, Jury Nullification and Jury-Control
Procedures, 65 NYU L Rev 825, 857, 867 (1990) (proposing that as part of the Sixth
Amendment, defendants have the right to preclude a prosecutor from "deliberately dis-
til[ling" "sympathetic heterodox viewpoints" from juries, and calling for "more exacting
standards for pre-qualification).
16 For example, lower court decisions testing judicial limitation of evidence, argument,
and jury instructions that invite nullification are numerous, but not particularly uniform.
A defense attorney's argument appealing to the juror's conscience may be greeted by one
trial judge with admiration, and by another with a jail sentence. Compare United States v
Datcher, 830 F Supp 411, 417-18 (M D Tenn 1993) (permitting defense counsel to argue to
the jury that the penalty for the crime is too severe); Commonwealth v Leno, 415 Mass
835, 616 NE2d 453, 457 (1993) (Liacos concurring) (stating that defendant in illegal needle
distribution case should be able to present evidence so as to allow "the jury to fulfill [its]
vital functions"), with Pounders v Watson, 117 S Ct 2359, 2363 (1997) (upholding contempt
conviction of attorney after she asked witness in front of the jury about the penalty facing
her client "in knowing violation of a clear and specific direction from the trial judge");
United States v Manning, 79 F3d 212, 219 (1st Cir 1996) (rejecting efforts by defense
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consensus about the extent to which the Constitution protects
jury nullification, or in what constitutional provisions that pro-
tection may be found.
Law reviews and case reporters advance radically different
explanations of the unreviewable power of juries to acquit. Many
judges appear to view the jury's power to nullify as an unfortu-
nate byproduct of the vigorous protection of other important con-
stitutional values, not an end in itself.7 By contrast, much of the
commentary on jury nullification assumes that the Constitution
affirmatively protects the jury's power, describing that power as a
personal constitutional right of every juror in a criminal case, as
a right guaranteed to the defendant by the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments, or as one of the checks and balances on other insti-
tutions of federal government provided by Article lI. s These al-
ternative theories about the source of the jury's power to nullify
have different implications for the legality of various nullification
controls.
This Article focuses on two means of controlling nullification:
exclusion of nullifiers from juries, discussed in Part I; and restric-
tions on nullification advocacy outside the courtroom, discussed
in Part 11. Part I begins with a brief description of recent treat-
ment of jurors sympathetic to nullification. Part I.A then reviews
four alternative theories regarding the nature and source of the
power to nullify, and summarizes how each might affect present
juror exclusion practices. Part I.B turns to the past, examining
whether judges in prior decades warded off nullification by dis-
counsel to inform the jury of the severity of punishment as an indirect attempt to provoke
jury nullification); United States v Calhoun, 49 F3d 231, 236 n 6 (6th Cir 1995) (upholding
district court's refusal to allow defense to inform the jury of the sentence to which defen-
dant would be subject if found guilty, and of its nullification power); United States v Ren-
froe, 634 F Supp 1536, 1550 (w D Pa 1986) (upholding contempt conviction of lawyer who
insisted on arguing to the jury that it could acquit if it disagreed with the government's
policy for granting immunity, characterizing lawyer's actions as serious disobedience of a
judge's order, a specific attempt to "subvert the judicial process" and to produce a miscar-
riage of justice), citing ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 4-7.8 (ABA 2d ed 1980) (pro-
viding that lawyers should not inject issues into the trial broader than guilt or innocence
of the accused under the controlling law); Medley v Commonwealth, 704 SW2d 190, 191
(Ky 1985) (rejecting defendant's claim that he should have been able to tell the jurors that,
while convicting on the principle offense, they could refuse to find persistent felony of-
fender status in order to avoid triggering a mandatory sentence enhancement if they con-
cluded that the sentence enhancement was too severe. The court reached this conclusion
despite the jury's statutory right to sentence the defendant and its earlier verdict form
stating that it "felt that the minimum sentence [of ten years for the principal offense] is
too severe in this case."). See also People v Wright, 168 Mise 2d 787, 645 NYS2d 275, 277
(NY Sup Ct 1996) (upholding a jury instruction stating that the jury may not assess the
propriety of police conduct in making its decision).
17 See text accompanying notes 58-60.
18 See text accompanying notes 63-70.
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qualifying legal skeptics from criminal juries, and whether they
considered themselves constrained by the Constitution when do-
ing so. Finding that courts have rather consistently culled nullifi-
ers from the jury box throughout the years, I examine in Parts
1.C and I.D two additional reasons to continue allowing judges to
exclude from juries those who refuse to abide by the law. Part I
concludes by suggesting that the exclusion and punishment of
nullifying jurors is adequately regulated by three general princi-
ples that do not depend on the recognition of nullification as a
positive good.
Part H then turns its attention outside the courtroom, to at-
tempts to control nullification advocacy. Following a description
of these attempts, I suggest a framework for evaluating the con-
stitutionality of restrictions on pro-nullification speech.
I. EXCLUDING NULLIFIERS FROM THE JURY
It is common today for judges to excuse "for cause" those ve-
nirepersons who reveal themselves as potential nullifiers during
voir dire. A juror may be excused after admitting that she be-
lieves in a juror's right to acquit a person the law says is guilty,
expressing doubts about the law under which the defendant is
charged, revealing suspicions about how that law has been en-
forced, or otherwise indicating unwillingness to convict the ac-
cused upon learning the legal standards that apply. Death pen-
alty cases are the best known example of cases in which chal-
lenges for cause are regularly employed to excuse potential jurors
because of their disagreement with the law. 9 Other recent exam-
ples include drug,2 money laundering," and tax evasion cases,'
as well as cases brought against sympathetic defendants.' Courts
See notes 74-86 and accompanying text.
See United States v McCarthy, 961 F2d 972, 976 (1st Cir 1992) (upholding judge's
decision to excuse juror for cause based on the juror's views in favor of drug legalization);
State v Smith, 850 SW2d 934, 938-39 (Mo Ct App 1993) (upholding judge's decision to ex-
cuse jurors who did not believe marijuana possession should be a crime); State v Gray, 812
SW2d 935, 938 (Mo Ct App 1991) (upholding judge's decision to excuse juror who had used
drugs and believed in decriminalization of drugs). But see Atkins v State, 1997 Tex Crim
App LEXIS 29, *7 (finding it improper for prosecutor to ask veniremembers if they would
convict a hypothetical suspect for possession of a pipe containing residue amounts of
crack, when the hypothetical situation was identical to the facts of the actual case).
1 See United States v Devery, 935 F Supp 393, 400 (S D NY 1996) (upholding excusal,
in money laundering case, of jurors who admitted restructuring large cash transactions in
order to avoid federal reporting requirements).
' See United States v Stillhammer, 706 F2d 1072, 1074 (10th Cir 1983) (upholding
judge's decision to excuse for cause a juror who believed that withholding taxes would be
morally justified in some circumstances).
See State v Prewitt, 714 SW2d 544, 550 (Mo Ct App 1986) (upholding state challenge
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also have excluded jurors who insist that the prosecutor meet a
higher standard of proof than the law imposes.'
Recent cases suggest that judges readily excuse for cause
those potential jurors exposed to FIJA propaganda. In one case, a
grocery store printed an article about nullification on its paper
bags, the possession of which reportedly disqualified one cus-
tomer from jury service.' In a Colorado case, the judge dismissed
all seventy prospective jurors called to serve after it was discov-
ered that one of them had passed around a copy of a FIJA bro-
chure.' In California, a judge reportedly excused anyone who was
a member of FIJA or who listened to a radio station that had
aired nullification-friendly advocacy.27 A judge in Dayton, Ohio
dismissed all of the prospective jurors called to court one day af-
ter learning that a man was handing out brochures about nullifi-
cation outside the courthouse."
The same beliefs that may disqualify a potential juror during
voir dire also can prompt exclusion or mistrial if disclosed after
the trial starts, but before the jury has reached a verdict. As tri-
als lengthen, judges face mid-trial revelations of juror bias more
frequently than in the past.' Fellow jurors' reports of a juror's ex-
tra-legal objections to conviction may lead to the dismissal of the
protesting juror or even to a mistrial."0 For example, in one Call-
for cause ofjuror who expressed reluctance to convict defendant of capital murder because
the defendant was the mother of five children).
See, for example, Drew v Collins, 964 F2d 411, 416-17 (5th Cir 1992) (upholding
trial judge's decision to exclude juror who stated on several occasions that he would hold
the state to a higher burden of proof than the "reasonable doubt" standard); Common-
wealth v Chambers, 528 Pa 558, 599 A2d 630, 635 (1991) (upholding challenge for cause of
a juror who stated: "i'd have to be definitely, absolutely satisfied. If rd have a doubt then
someone would have to prove to me to the nth degree."); Castillo v State, 913 SW2d 529,
537 (Tex Crim App 1995) (Mansfield dissenting) (discussing cases in which the state
challenged venirepersons who stated that they would hold the state to a higher burden of
proof than reasonable doubt under a state provision that permits prosecution to challenge
for cause any juror with "bias or prejudice against any phase of the law upon which the
State is entitled to rely for conviction or punishment").
See Rose Albano, Sacking Jury Service? Grocery Bags Offer Tips for Avoidance,
Modesto Bee (Apr 12, 1996).
See Dodge, 9:1 FJActivist at 4 (cited in note 7).
See Doig, 8:2 FIJActivist at 4 (cited in note 7) (reporting this conduct by a judge in
Butte County, California).
" See Todd R. Wallack, Judges Hit 'Vote Conscience" Jurors, Dayton Daily News Al
(Sept 17, 1994). See also Christine Stapleton, Jury Picked in Crack-House Arson Trial,
Palm Beach Post BI (July 24, 1996) (reporting that during juror selection for the case of a
man charged with arson for burning down a crackhouse, jurors were asked whether they
had been contacted by FIJA).
See Nancy J. King, Juror Delinquency in Criminal Trials in America, 1796-1996, 94
Mich L Rev 2673, 2708-19 (1996) (discussing how longer trials and increased demands on
jury behavior have expanded opportunities for jury misconduct).
See People v Feagin, 34 Cal App 4th 1427, 40 Cal Rptr 2d 918, 922 (1995) (upholding
The University of Chicago Law Review
fornia case the judge declared a mistrial after discovering mid-
trial that four jurors disagreed with the "three strikes" law, and
that there were only two alternates to replace them.3 A Missouri
judge reportedly declared a mistrial after he learned FIJA mem-
bers had distributed leaflets outside of the courthouse. He stated
that he wanted to avoid trying a case with jurors "exposed to such
misinformation."32 Sometimes jurors who advocate nullification
during deliberations are prosecuted later for failing to reveal
their views during voir dire or for telling other jurors during de-
liberations that they can ignore the judge's instructions.3
Recently, two such cases received substantial publicity. One
began when juror Laura Kriho held out against conviction in a
routine Colorado drug case.' She became the target of an investi-
excusal of holdout after interviews with jurors revealed that the juror refused to change
her position, expressed her belief that the police are prejudiced, and discussed the Rodney
King case); Julio Moran, Apologetic Juror Avoids Citation for Misconduct, LA Times B3
(June 19, 1992) (describing case in which jurors reported to the judge a juror who argued
that instructions can be ignored). Another recent case in which jurors have been removed
for what are arguably beliefs against the law is United States v Geffrard, 87 F3d 448 (11th
Cir 1996), in which a juror sent a letter to the judge explaining her religious opposition to
conviction. She explained that she believed that the defendants were "unjustly led into
this so called transaction," that "something is horribly wrong with a society that seeks out
its victim and finds its strength on preying off of the weakness of that victim," and that
her beliefs were related to her adherence to the teachings of Emanuel Swedenborg, whose
followers founded the Church of the New Jerusalem. Id at 453-54. The court of appeals
upheld the conviction that resulted following the removal of this juror, noting that the "ju-
ror is fully entitled to her religious beliefs and may espouse'them, but in this jury context,
where the court's rules-not hers-apply, it cannot be said that the district judge abused
his discretion." Id at 452.
31 See Jones v Hennessey, 1995 US Dist LEXIS 19540, *1, *3-6 (N D Cal). The defen-
dants challenge to his retrial was rejected. Id at *3. See also King, 94 Mich L Rev at 2737
(cited in note 29) (reporting judges' responses to a survey on jury misconduct; responses
included reports ofjury nullification in response to stiff mandatory sentences).
Dodge, 9:1 FIJActivist at 8 (cited in note 7).
See Moran, LA Times at B3 (reporting a case ending in a hung jury in which a juror
who argued to other jurors that instructions can be ignored was reported to the judge by
the other jurors and then dismissed; the juror escaped contempt of court charges by apolo-
gizing). See also Joe Lambe, Bill Would Let Juries Decide Law in Cases; Legal Establish-
ment Reacts to Measure with Shock, Dread, Kan City Star Al (Apr 8, 1996) (quoting prose-
cutor as saying that nullification is no different than perjury: "They say they can uphold
the law when they intend to subvert it,"). Compare Don Doig, State News: News and
Commentary from the Frontlines of the FIJA Movement, 20 FIJActivist 4 (Autumn 1995)
(reporting that a FIJA activist in Rhode Island "was kicked off the Grand Jury he was sit-
ting on for telling the other members what their rights were"). Nor is the judicial urge to
punish jurors for their independence limited to this country. In England, a judge recently
cited two women jurors in a counterfeiting case for contempt and jailed them for thirty
days after they allegedly refused to take part in jury discussions due to their "conscious"
beliefs. After her release, one of the former jurors described the judge as "a very spiteful
and vindictive man." Richard Ford and Stephen Farrell, Judge Defends Jailing of Jurors,
The (London) Times 19 (Mar 26, 1997).




gation after a fellow juror told the trial judge about the argu-
ments Kriho had made during deliberation concerning nullifica-
tion and sentencing.35 After the jury was discharged, Kriho re-
portedly pulled a FIJA brochure from her purse and gave it to a
fellow juror.36 She was then charged and eventually convicted of
contempt for her conduct during voir dire."7 The judge who con-
victed her found that she had deliberately withheld information
that she had been convicted of possessing drugs, that she was a
founder and activist in the Boulder Hemp Initiative Project, and
that she had "some relationship with" FIJA." Although Kriho
never was asked directly during voir dire about either her prior
convictions or her involvement in these organizations, the judge
nevertheless concluded that she knew she "should have revealed
any opinions or strong feelings" about a juror's duty to follow or
enforce the drug laws. 9 Furthermore, he found that she intended
"to withhold this information from the trial court and the parties
so that she could be selected to serve on the jury and obstruct the
judicial process.""
In the second case, United States v Thomas,41 several white
jurors in a federal narcotics case reported to the judge that one of
the jurors, the only African-American, was disrupting delibera-
tions and stating that he was going to acquit because he believed
the African-American defendants on trial were justified in
breaking the law due to their disadvantaged situation. The judge
dismissed the juror after finding that he was not following the
court's instructions, and the jury went on to convict. The defen-
5 See id at 8; David E. Rovella, Judge: Juror Didn't Nullify-She Lied, Nal L J A8
(Feb 24, 1997).
People v I&iho, No 96-CR-91, slip op at 8 (Colo Dist Ct, Feb 10, 1997).
Id at 10-12.
Id at 6-7. The government alleged that during deliberations Kriho told the jurors
that 'she did not feel drug laws were appropriate, that these matters needed to be handled
by the family"; "that this [jury trial] is how laws get changed, and made references to the
Salem witch trials and the 1st Amendment"; 'that she opposed all laws on drugs... and
[that] she 'was going to hang the jury because of the law"; and that she had "researched
the possible penalty for the charge on a computer and told the jurors the defendant would
receive a mandatory minimum prison sentence." Amicus Curiae Brief for the Texas
Criminal Defense Lawyers Association at 2-3, Kriho, No 96-CR-91, citing Motion for Con-
tempt at 3-4, Kriho, No 96-CR-91. The prosecutor characterized Kriho's failure to volun-
teer these views earlier, during voir dire, as contemptuous and argued that Kriho dis-
obeyed an order of the court, obstructed the administration ofjustice, and committed per-
jury. Kriho, No 96-CR-91, slip op at 1. The judge did not name the organization in his or-
der, but FIJA reported that the brochure she pulled from her purse was theirs. Shell, 8:2
FIJActivist at 8 (cited in note 34).
Kriho, No 96-CR-91, slip op at 5.
Id at 4, 8. She has appealed. Larry Dodge, What's the latest about Laura Kriho? 8:2
FIJActivist 5, 7 (Summer 1997).
116 F3d 606 (2d Cir 1997).
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dants appealed, objecting to the judge's decision to remove the ju-
ror. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals agreed that nullifying
jurors should be dismissed, but remanded the case because the
proof of the excluded juror's intent to nullify was not "without
doubt."42
Scholars discussing jury nullification have virtually ignored
these decisions in which potential nullifiers are disqualified or
punished. The void may be explained in part by the futility of ob-
jecting on appeal to the exclusion of potential nullifiers under
current standards of review. Not only is it difficult for a defen-
dant to demonstrate that a judge abused her discretion43 by erro-
neously excluding a juror for cause during voir dire, but even an
erroneous exclusion is treated as harmless error. For one thing,
the prosecutor probably could have used a peremptory challenge
to exclude the juror anyway.' Moreover, an erroneous exclusion
does not indicate any particular bias among the remaining panel,
and is considered harmless as long as none of the jury's remain-
ing members could have been challenged for cause.45 A judge's re-
spose to the mid-trial revelation of nullification is more likely to
be the subject of appellate review,46 but in most jurisdictions will
42 Id at 625.
4' See Patton v Yount, 467 US 1025, 1038 (1984) (holding that a judge's determination
of the impartiality of a potential juror is "entitled to... 'special deference"); Irvin v Dowd,
366 US 717, 723-24 (1961) (holding that a trial court's determination of the bias of a pro-
spective juror is reversible on appeal only if it is manifest error).
" A juror's misgivings about the law or its applications often form the "race neutral"
reasons that courts have held justify what otherwise may appear to be race-based chal-
lenges. In a recent Texas drug case, for example, a defendant challenged the prosecutor's
use of her peremptory challenges to strike five African-American jurors. Hawkins v State,
793 SW2d 291, 293 (Tex Crim App 1990). As for two of the excluded jurors, the prosecutor
argued that they were struck for misgivings they had regarding the police and certain
drug laws. One juror had had a bad experience with police officers in the past and did not
feel he was treated right by the police.'Id. Another said that she was having difficulty with
the drug law under which the defendant was charged. Id at 294. The court was willing to
accept the prosecutor's explanations as race neutral reasons for peremptories, but con-
ceded that it might not have accepted them as a basis for a challenge for cause. Id. See
also Carrol v State, 1996 Ala Crim App LEXIS 238, *12-16 (upholding prosecutor's chal-
lenge of jurors who responded that they had concerns about police tampering in the O.J.
Simpson case); State v Porter, 326 NC 489, 497-98, 391 SE2d 144, 152-53 (NC 1990) (ac-
cepting prosecutor's explanation that peremptory challenge was based not on race but on
juror's view that racism motivated the prosecution).
' See, for example, United States v Joseph, 892 F2d 118, 122-24 (DC Cir 1989) (find-
ing no abuse of discretion in judge's decision to excuse juror who said he would follow the
Lord's "instructions" rather than the court's, but also noting that "the exclusion of a single
juror, even if improper, does not suggest any lack of impartiality on the part of those ju-
rors in fact serving").
' If the judge orders a mistrial, and the prosecutor seeks a new trial, the defendant
may claim that a lack of "manifest necessity" for aborting the first trial bars retrial. If the
judge chooses instead to continue the trial after dismissing the alleged nullifier, and the
jury, cleansed of its dissenter, returns a guilty verdict, the defendant could appeal the ju-
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be upheld absent an abuse of discretion.4
There are important reasons to look more closely at these ne-
glected issues. First, peremptory challenges are under attack."
With fewer peremptory challenges available, courts cannot use
them as easily to conceal or cure erroneous rulings on challenges
for cause. Second, the Supreme Court has refused to find harm-
less the erroneous exclusion of a juror mildly opposed to the death
penalty, even when a peremptory challenge was available to the
prosecutor to excuse the same juror, and even when the resulting
jury contained no one who could be challenged for cause." Some
have suggested that the same vigilance should extend to errone-
ous exclusions of jurors who voice skepticism about other aspects
of the criminal law.5 Third, mid-trial revelations of nullification
advocacy by jurors show no signs of abating. Each juror exposed
as a potential nullifier poses a difficult dilemma for the trial
judge and the appropriate response is not at all clear. Finally, the
history of government efforts to purge criminal juries of those op-
posed to its policies is fascinating, a story worth telling for its
own sake.
An analysis of the ability of judges to disqualify criminal law
skeptics from serving as criminal jurors must begin by examining
the constitutional roots of the nullification power. Only the Con-
stitution could forbid local definitions of "cause" for qualification
and removal that would otherwise effectively exclude most poten-
tial nullifiers from criminal juries.
ror's dismissal. See, for example, Ex parte Hernandez, 906 SW2d 931, 932 (Tex Crim App
1995) (finding that manifest necessity existed for mistrial due to the discovery during trial
that one juror was biased and had to be dismissed).
' See Thomas, 116 F3d at 613-14, 624 (reviewing decisions applying FRCrP 23(b),
which allows for the mid-trial dismissal of jurors); People v Thomas, 26 Cal App 4th 1328,
1332-33, 32 Cal Rptr 2d 177, 179 (1994) (discussing Cal Code Civ Pro § 233: "[The court,
upon 'good cause shown,' may discharge any juror 'found unable to perform his duty' at
any time during the trial.").
See Minetos v City University of New York, 925 F Supp 177, 181-85 (S D NY 1996)
(holding that discriminatory use of peremptory challenges violated the excluded jurors'
equal protection rights); Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire,
Peremptory Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U Chi L Rev 153, 209 (1989)
(calling for the abolition of peremptory challenges); Amar, 28 UC Davis L Rev at 1182-83
(cited in note 15) (same). See also Nancy S. Marder, Beyond Gender: Peremptory Chal-
lenges and the Roles of the Jury, 73 Tex L Rev 1041, 1045 (1995) (arguing that the jury is a
public institution and that "[p]eremptories are harmful to this public value decisionmak-
ing because they exclude from the jury a range of values and perspectives").
See notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
See, for example, Rights and Responsibilities (cited in note 14) (comments of Judge
Weinstein); Weinberg-Brodt, Note, 65 NYU L Rev at 856-57 (cited in note 15).
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A. The Constitutional Roots of Nullification-What Are They
and Are They Violated by Efforts to Exclude Nullifiers
from Juries?
Although scholars have been debating the constitutional
roots of the power of jurors to acquit for years, the origins of jury
nullification remain elusive. The Constitution is silent on the
point, and while the Framers clearly considered essential the
right to a jury trial in criminal cases, historical accounts of their
intent regarding the extent of the criminal jury's power are in-
conclusive."' Similarly, there is little consistency in colonial prac-
tice that would shed light on whether the new nation's judges
agreed that the Constitution embodied a law-finding function for
juries.52
Supreme Court precedent on the point is also ambiguous. For
a century, lower courts debated the scope of the jurors' power to
determine the law for themselves.53 The Supreme Court effec-
tively quieted this discussion in 1895 when it decided Sparf and
Hansen v United States.54 In the course of rejecting the claim of a
" See, for example, Julius Goebel, Jr., 1 History of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801 500-01, 506-07, 658-61 (MacMillan 1971) (dis-
cussing the historical importance of the jury to Americans and also the lack of clear direc-
tion regarding impaneling and challenging jurors); Shannon C. Stimson, The American
Revolution in the Law: Anglo-American Jurisprudence Before John Marshall 65 (MacMil-
lan 1990) (arguing that although juries had been accepted as the proper judges of the law
in colonies, the revolutionary judges and "key constitutional thinkers such as Adams, Jef-
ferson, Hamilton, and Wilson" presented "conflicting theoretical and ideological views
on... the proper locus of [law's] final determination"). For a defense of jury power to re-
turn general verdicts contrary to judicial direction before the Revolution, see The English-
Mans Right: A Dialogue Between a Barrister at Law, and a Jury-Man (1680), reprinted in
Justices and Juries in Colonial America: Two Accounts, 1680-1722 22-31 (Arno 1972). Pro-
fessor Akhil Amar has collected support for his claim that the Constitution was originally
understood as preserving a jury's right to refuse to follow a law it deems unconstitutional
in his forthcoming book. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights: Creation and Reconstruction
(forthcoming Yale 1998). This understanding is said to have been reinforced by the libel
trial of John Peter Zenger in 1734. See, for example, Albert W. Alschuler and Andrew G.
Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U Chi L Rev 867, 874
(1994). Opponents of nullification read the record differently. Professor Andrew Leipold
has argued that aside from "occasional statements by leading figures of the day, there is [ ]
little evidence that the framers were concerned about the issue," although he admits this
silence may mean that "the right to nullify was so well-established that the Framers saw
no reason to mention it." Leipold, 82 Va L Rev at 290 (cited in note 8).
One study of judicial openness to evidence, argument, and instructions about the
law revealed a wide variety in practice. See Stanton D. Krauss, An Inquiry into the Right
of Criminal Juries to Determine the Law in Colonial America 4 (unpublished manuscript
on file with U Chi L Rev).
See, for example, United States v Morris, 26 F Cas 1323, 1331-36 (Cir Ct D Mass
1851) (rejecting the argument that the Jury Clause in Article III grants juries the right to
decide law, and collecting contradictory cases). See generally Mark DeWolfe Howe, Note,
Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 Harv L Rev 582 (1939) (collecting decisions).
156 US 51 (1895).
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convicted murderer that his constitutional rights were violated
when his jury was instructed that no evidence supported the
lesser offense of manslaughter, the Court canvassed the authority
for and against the jury's "right to take upon themselves the de-
termination of both law and fact" and came down solidly against
the whole business.5 Many have interpreted the Sparf Court's
condemnation of nullification as a green light to control nullifica-
tion in other ways throughout the criminal process. However, the
Court's sweeping rhetoric must be read cautiously. Sparfs hold-
ing addressed only the presence of a constitutional entitlement to
lesser included offense instructions in criminal cases. Sparf did
not consider or condone all other judicial attempts to control nul-
lification. Indeed, in Sparf and subsequent decisions the Court
acknowledged that there are some constitutional limits on what
steps judges can take to avoid or to trump jury verdicts of acquit-
tal in criminal cases. It has interpreted the Double Jeopardy
Clause to bar the review of verdicts of acquittal, for example,"
and the Sixth Amendment to prohibit a judge from entering a
judgment of conviction before the jury reaches a verdict, even
given compelling evidence of guilt. 7 The Court's decisions have
left commentators debating what theory of jury power could ex-
plain why the Court has drawn the line between acceptable and
unacceptable controls on nullification where it has.
This Part reviews several alternative interpretations of the
jury's nullification power and considers how each would affect ju-
dicial efforts to exclude nullifiers from criminal juries. It begins
by examining the theory that seems closest to the one espoused
by the majority of justices in Sparf-that jury nullification is an
unavoidable cost of protecting the defendant's entitlements to fi-
nality and to a jury's view of the facts.
"Id at 65. The Court concluded that:
The trial was thus conducted upon the theory that it was the duty of the court to ex-
pound the law and that of the jury to apply the law as thus declared to the facts as
ascertained by them. In this separation of the functions of court and jury is found the
chief value, as well as safety, of the jury system. Those functions cannot be con-
founded or disregarded without endangering the stability of public justice, as well as
the security of private and personal rights.
Id at 106.
" Id at 105-06; United States v Ball, 163 US 662, 669 (1896) (holding that the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars the retrial on the same charge of a defendant acquitted of murder).
, Connecticut v Johnson, 460 US 73, 84 (1983); Sparf, 156 US at 105.
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1. Nullification as nuisance.
The approach least likely to offer any impediment to the ex-
clusion of potential nullifiers is the view that the jury's ability to
acquit against the law without judicial interference is not an af-
firmative grant of power but rather an unavoidable result of the
recognition of two other important rights: the defendant's right
under the Sixth Amendment to a jury's independent assessment
of the facts,58 and the defendant's interest in the finality of ac-
quittals protected by the Double Jeopardy Clause. 9 In essence,
the jurors may be wrong about the law when they acquit, but
identifying and correcting their error would unduly threaten
these important procedural rights."°
The Court's classic articulation of this aspect of the Sixth Amendment guarantee
appears in the decision first applying the Sixth Amendments Jury Clause to the states.
See Duncan v Louisiana, 391 US 145, 156 (1968) (stating that the Sixth Amendment, by
"[piroviding the accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers [gives] him an in-
estimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compli-
ant, biased, or eccentric judge").
See United States v DiFrancesco, 449 US 117, 128-36 (1980) (discussing how the
Double Jeopardy Clause protects the interest of the public and the defendant in the final-
ity ofjudgments in criminal cases). The Court has declared that the ban against retrial af-
ter acquittal is not restricted to jury trials. See Burks v United States, 437 US 1, 10-11, 18
(1978) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids the retrial of a defendant whose
conviction by a jury was overturned by the court of appeals for insufficient evidence);
Sanabria v United States, 437 US 54, 75-78 (1978) (holding that the Double Jeopardy
Clause forbids retrial of an acquitted defendant even if the trial judge erroneously ex-
cluded evidence that might have led to conviction); United States v Martin Linen Supply
Co, 430 US 564, 575-76 (1977) (holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause forbids retrial af-
ter an acquittal entered by the trial court after a jury mistrial); Kepner v United States,
195 US 100, 133-34 (1904) (interpreting territorial statutory language identical to that
found in the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar government appeals of bench acquittals in the
Philippines). See also George C. Thomas, An Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 U
Ill L Rev 827, 829 (arguing that -verdict finality" is the core protection of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause); Leipold, 82 Va L Rev at 268-75 (cited in note 8) (discussing Thomas's "final-
ity" thesis).
' Under this view, the present rule allowing judicial review of jury convictions but not
acquittals may be explained as a device to avoid mistaking a jury that follows the law but
has a reasonable doubt about guilt for a lawless, nulhifying jury. Post-verdict review of ac-
quittals is complicated when some jurors vote not guilty because they had a reasonable
doubt about whether the elements of the crime had been established, but others vote not
guilty for other reasons. Even if all of the jurors agreed that the defendant was not guilty
under the law, their individual reasons for acquitting could be completely different. See,
for example, Schopp, 69 S Cal L Rev at 2099 n 163 (cited in note 5) (arguing that jurors
may reach the same conclusions for different reasons). Moreover, proof that the jury ac-
quitted for one reason and not another is hard to come by. Chief Justice Vaughan recog-
nized this more than three centuries ago in a famous decision freeing jurors imprisoned
for acquitting William Penn and William Mead of unlawful assembly. He explained that
no judge could be certain whether a general verdict reflected the jury's conclusions about
the facts or its conclusions about the law. See Bushell's Case, Vaughan 135, 124 Eng Rep
1006, 1012-16 (CP 1670). See also Trial of William Penn and William Mead, at the Old
Bailey, for a Tumultuous Assembly, 6 Howelrs St Tr 951, 968 (1670) (reporting Hale's con-
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Alternatively, even if some review of jury acquittals would be
consistent with the right to be free from a second prosecution or
the right to have facts found first by a jury,6 the ban against re-
view of acquittals could be premised upon nonconstitutional
grounds. The costs of providing even limited review of acquittals,
including the difficulty involved in isolating what caused an ac-
quittal and the expense of disturbing jury verdicts, may not be
worth the benefits that would accrue from providing review. 2
Under either of these explanations, nullification need not be
protected, only tolerated when expedient. Neither theory presents
an impenetrable constitutional barrier to the exclusion of poten-
tial nullifiers from jury panels before a verdict is returned. In-
deed, screening out legal skeptics during voir dire would seem to
be an effective method of controlling lawless acquittals, a method
that avoids interference with either the jury's factfinding or the
finality of the jury's verdict.
2. The juror's fundamental right to nullify.
Other explanations of nullification accord it more direct con-
stitutional status. Among these, the theory of nullification as a
juror's personal right places the strongest restraint on what
judges can do directly to jurors." The idea here is that any citizen
clusion that judges cannot know whether a jury's decision reflects its conclusions of fact or
of law).
61 Some scholars have argued that judges reviewing criminal cases are capable of dis-
tinguishing a nullifying jury from one that acquitted for other reasons, and that double
jeopardy no more prevents retrial after appeal by the prosecutor than it does by the defen-
dant. See, for example, Peter Westen and Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of
Double Jeopardy, 1978 S Ct Rev 81, 129 (arguing that a government appeal from a jury's
acquittal would not intrude upon the authority of the jury to find the facts and noting that
a government appeal in a civil case is not prohibited by the Seventh Amendment's lan-
guage forbidding appellate courts from reexamining any fact tried by a jury). Compare
Bushell's Case, 124 Eng Rep at 1012-16 (explaining that because jurors use their own
knowledge, in addition to evidence at trial, a judge could never tell whether a jury was ac-
tually nullifying).
The frequency of disagreement between judge and jury is probably low, while the
cost of processing government appeals may be very high for the court system, defendants,
and jurors. See Kalven and Zeisel, The American Jury at 116 (cited in note 1) (noting that
in almost half of the cases where the judge disagreed with the jury's decision, the dis-
agreement included both facts and law- the jury's verdict gives "expression to values and
sentiments under the guise of answering questions of fact"). See also Westen and Drubel,
1978 S Ct Rev at 132-37 (arguing that even though nothing in the Constitution bars gov-
ernment appeals from acquittals in bench trials, a jurisdiction may have good reasons
(promoting leniency, encouraging bench trials, etc.) to adopt such a rule as part of its do-
mestic law).
See, for example, Sparf, 156 US at 113 (Gray dissenting) (arguing that the judge's
instruction "denied [the jurors the] right to decide the law"); William M. Kunstler, Jury
Nullification in Conscience Cases, 10 Va J Intl L 71, 75, 83 (1969) (finding a historical
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who serves as a juror in a criminal case has a civic duty and
privilege to stand as a barrier of conscience between the govern-
ment and the accused. While no reference to an individual right
to nullify appears in the Constitution or in the Bill of Rights, the
lack of express textual authorization has not deterred the Su-
preme Court in the past from declaring certain individual rights
to be fundamental. 4 At the time the Constitution was drafted and
ratified, some of the most influential political thinkers believed
that an essential function of the jury was to advance the moral
development of each individual juror.65 Today's advocates of a
personal right to nullif 66 are encouraged by the Supreme Court's
recent recognition of the equal protection rights of jurors in its
peremptory challenge cases and by the lower courts' recognition
of the privacy rights of jurors.67 Even state politicians are em-
bracing juror rights as a cost-free, feel-good strategy, declaring
September 5, the anniversary of one famous jury's refusal to con-
vict William Penn," "Jury Rights Day." 9 At least one state has
proposed a juror's "Bill of Rights. 70
right to jury instructions on the power to nullify, and arguing that such a right continues
to be necessary to the jury's proper functions); Joseph L. Sax, Conscience and Anarchy:
The Prosecution of War Resisters, 57 Yale Rev 484,491 (1968) (supporting the use of nulli-
fication by juries in the prosecutions of Vietnam war resisters).
See, for example, Shapiro v Thompson, 394 US 618, 629-31 (1969) (recognizing fun-
damental right to travel despite the lack of express textual authorization). The explana-
tions offered for the absence of any reference to a right to travel can also be advanced for
the absence of a reference to the right to nullify. See United States v Guest, 383 US 745,
758 (1966) (suggesting that the Framers left out any reference to the right to travel be-
cause they believed it was so basic it need not be expressed); John E. Nowak and Ronald
D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 14.38 at 927 (West 5th ed 1995) (suggesting that the
Framers believed the guarantee was subsumed in other protections).
"See Akbil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L J 1131, 1186-
87 (1991), citing de Tocqueville and the "Maryland Farmer." See also note 51.
See FIJA, True or False?: Factual Information About Jury Service (pamphlet)
("When it's your turn to serve, remember. (1) you may-and should-vote your conscience;
(2) you cannot be forced to obey a 'juror's oath'; (3) it is your responsibility to 'hang' the
jury with your vote if you disagree with the other jurors!").
"See Powers v Ohio, 499 US 400, 409 (1991) (recognizing equal protection rights of
jurors); Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79, 87 (1986) (noting that discriminatory peremptory
challenges harm excluded jurors); Brandborg v Lucas, 891 F Supp 352, 357 (E D Tex 1995)
(recognizing juror's right to decline to answer certain questions); United States v Padilla-
Valenzuela, 896 F Supp 968, 971 (D Ariz 1995) (same); Nancy A. Novak, Note, Jury on
Trial: Juror's Constitutional Right to Privacy Falls Under Scrutiny of the Courts, 3 San
Diego Justice J 215, 216-17 (1995) (discussing the balance between a juror's right to pri-
vacy and the interests of the defendant).
"Penn's jurors were eventually released after they had been imprisoned for refusing
to convict. See Bushell's Case, 124 Eng Rep 1006; Don C. Seitz, ed, The Tryal of William
Penn and William Mead for Causing a Tumult 35 (Marshall Jones 1919).
"See, for example, 8:2 FIJActivist 26 (Summer 1996) (reprinting official statement of
John G. Rowland, Governor of Connecticut, designating September 5, 1996, "Jury Rights
Day" in the State of Connecticut). According to FIJA, as of Summer 1996, sixteen gover-
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Jury trials could be affected profoundly if the freedom to vote
against convicting a person condemned by the law was recognized
as a fundamental right. To exclude a juror solely because she ex-
presses some willingness to do what the Constitution authorizes
her to do would be as suspect as excluding her from the polls be-
cause of her desire to vote for an unpopular candidate. Excluding
nullifiers might still be justified if one assumes that the govern-
ment has a compelling interest in securing juror adherence to the
law.7' Yet this is the very assumption that advocates of the juror's
right to nullify contest. A juror's right to nullify is on its face in-
compatible with a legitimate governmental interest in preventing
nullification. Compromise seems impossible. A constitutional
right to nullify must include a prohibition on all intentional ex-
clusion of potential nullifiers from juries.
3. The defendant's right to a jury that is free to nullify.
The Sixth Amendment offers an alternative basis that may
prohibit judges from purging nullifiers from juries. Until rela-
nors had signed FIJA's Jury Rights Day proclamation. Jury Rights Day, 8:2 FIJActivist 1,
3 (Summer 1996).
" Report of the Arizona Supreme Court Committee on More Effective Use of Juries,
Jurors: The Power of 12 130-32 (Sept 1994).
"1 See, for example, Ramos v State, 934 SW2d 358, 368 (Tex Crim App 1996) (explain-
ing why challenges of prospective jurors on the basis of religion are permissible: the state's
interest "is much more compelling... where the prospective jurors... cannot follow the
law (as opposed to merely being undesirable)"). It is not clear whether the Equal Protec-
tion Clause requires that courts regulate the exclusion ofjurors due to the exercise of fun-
damental rights as closely as they now regulate the exclusion due to race and gender. The
Court, for example, has yet to delineate the constitutional limits on a litigant's ability to
strike venirepersons because of their religious beliefs. See Davis v Minnesota, 511 US
1115, 1116-18 (1994) (Thomas dissenting from denial of cert). According to many courts
and commentators, religious exclusions are no longer tenable. See, for example, State v
Eason, 336 NC 730, 736-39, 445 SE2d 917, 921-23 (1994) (stating that the North Carolina
Constitution prohibits exclusion from jury service on account of religion, but that this pro-
hibition does not apply to exclusion on the basis of religious opposition to capital punish-
ment); Cheryl G. Bader, Batson Meets the First Amendment: Prohibiting Peremptory Chal-
lenges that Violate a Prospective Juror's Speech and Associative Rights, 24 Hofstra L Rev
567, 569, 599-601, 611-18 (1996) (arguing that the rationale for the Supreme Court's ban
on peremptory challenges based on race, ethnicity, or gender extends to support of a ban
on peremptory challenges based on religion or other organizational affiliations); Amy B.
Gendleman, Comment, The Equal Protection Clause, the Free Exercise Clause and Relig-
ion-Based Peremptory Challenges, 63 U Chi L Rev 1639, 1656-69 (1996) (arguing that per-
emptory challenges based on religious affiliation alone would violate a venireperson's right
to free exercise, but that peremptory challenges based upon an elicited religious belief
would not; and likening the dismissal of a juror because of her religious "belief or status"
to the denial of unemployment benefits and the right to seek office due to religious prac-
tices). Compare Krauss, 65 Wash U L Q at 543 (cited in note 15) (arguing that "[t]he ef-
fects of the peremptory excusal of [death penalty opponents] are of a different order en-
tirely" from the harms of race-based peremptory challenges, because the excused jurors
are not the "subject of prejudice' in society").
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tively recently, the Impartial Jury Clause guaranteed only that
the jury that ultimately tries the defendant be reasonably unbi-
ased.72 The impartiality of a jury did not depend upon the attrib-
utes of those who were not selected for the jury.
The Supreme Court modified this interpretation in a line of
cases originating with Witherspoon v Illinois.73 The Witherspoon
Court recognized, for the first time, a constitutional limit on the
government's right to challenge for cause. The Court agreed that
the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments allow prosecutors in capi-
tal cases to exclude any juror who could not vote to impose the
death penalty, but held that those same constitutional provisions
prohibit the exclusion of a juror whose doubts about the death
penalty were not strong enough to prevent the juror from sen-
tencing a defendant to death.74 To give this limit on the govern-
ment's ability to exclude death penalty opponents more bite, the
Court in Gray v Mississippi75 ordered resentencing for every capi-
' The phrase "impartial jury of the district" restricted only the location from which
the jury was drawn, not the process by which the jury was selected. The Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses were available to regulate abuses injury selection procedures.
" 391 US 510 (1968). The Court has also declared that the Sixth Amendment guaran-
tees a defendant the right to have his jury drawn from a cross-section of the relevant
community, but has refused to apply this theory to the voir dire process. Using its favorite
metaphor for jury selection, the Court has argued that a jury pool is like a deck of cards
that cannot be stacked by the court or the prosecutor in the government's favor. See Hol-
land v Illinois, 493 US 474, 481 (1990). See also Taylor v Louisiana, 419 US 522, 530
(1975) ("testricting jury service to only special groups or excluding identifiable segments
playing major roles in the community cannot be squared with the constitutional concept of
jury trial."); Ballard v United States, 329 US 187, 191-93 (1946) (holding that an all-male
jury is not representative of the community).
' See Witherspoon, 391 US at 518, 521 (finding that a jury purged of all opposition to
the death penalty "fell woefully short of that impartiality to which the petitioner was enti-
tled under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments" and stating that a "state may not en-
trust the determination of whether a man is innocent or guilty to a tribunal 'organized to
convict. ' ) (internal citation omitted). Some defense advocates have read the Witherspoon
line of cases as providing prosecutors with a new tool for stacking juries in their favor.
See, for example, Weinberg-Brodt, Note, 65 NYU L Rev at 851-57 (cited in note 15). With-
erspoon, however, did just the opposite-it erected a constitutional barrier to block some
governmental efforts to remove death opponents where none had existed before. See
Morgan v Illinois, 504 US 719, 731 (1992) ("At its inception, Witherspoon conferred no
'right! on a state, but was in reality a limitation on a State's making unlimited challenges
for cause to exclude those jurors who 'might hesitate' to return a verdict imposing death.")
(internal citation omitted); Wainwright v Witt, 469 US 412, 423 (1985) ("Witherspoon is
not a ground for challenging a prospective juror. It is rather a limitation on the State's
power to exclude... .') (internal citation omitted). See also Lockhart v McCree, 476 US
162, 168-73, 179-83 (1986) (noting the restrictions that Witherspoon places on states); Eric
Schnapper, Taking Witherspoon Seriously: The Search for Death-Qualified Jurors, 62 Tex
L Rev 977, 1058-59 (1984) (arguing that under Witherspoon "[olnly if jurors state, after re-
ceiving... a firm and specific explanation of their legal duties, that they will not obey the
law may they constitutionally be excused").
" 481 US 648 (1987).
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tal case in which the judge excluded a juror whose views about
the death penalty were not strong enough to justify exclusion.
Such error could not be harmless, the Court concluded, even
when the prosecutor could have excluded the juror with a per-
emptory challenge had the judge ruled correctly, and even when
the resulting jury included no one whom the defendant could
have challenged for cause.s
If the Sixth Amendment forbids prosecutors from banishing
jurors with moderate doubts about the legislature's chosen pun-
ishment from juries in order to secure that punishment, then the
Constitution also might bar government efforts to exclude jurors
with moderate doubts about the criminal law in order to secure
convictions, thus regulating a prosecutor's effort to "conviction-
qualify" every jury assessing guilt just as it regulates efforts to
"death-qualify" capital juries.
The Court, however, appears to have rejected such a reading.
In Lockhart v McCree7 the Court upheld a murder conviction de-
spite the defendant's argument that the prosecutor's challenges
for cause had deprived him of an impartial verdict under the
Sixth Amendment. The Court noted that the defendant's jury was
purged not only of nullifiers (defined by the Court as "individuals
who, because of their deep-seated opposition to the death penalty,
would be unable to decide a capital defendant's guilt or innocence
fairly and impartially"8 ), but also of "Witherspoon excludables,"
those venirepersons whose beliefs about the death penalty would
prevent the juror from imposing a sentence of death."9 "Wither-
spoon excludables" are, arguably, merely potential nullifiers-
persons with doubts that might lead them to acquit, but that
would not necessarily prevent them from convicting."0 Indeed, the
defendant in Lockhart argued that Witherspoon excludables are
more inclined to acquit, due to their views about the death pen-
' Id at 665 ("The nature of the jury selection process defies any attempt to establish
that an erroneous Witherspoon-Witt exclusion of a juror is harmless."); id at 671 (Powell
concurring) ("In my view, our decision in Davis is sufficient to resolve the case, given that
we cannot know what effect the excluded juror would have had on the panel as a whole.").
See also Davis v Georgia, 429 US 122, 123 (1976) (per curiam) (holding that a Witherspoon
error is never harmless).
476 US 162, 183-84(1986).
Id at 172. See also id ("[The defendant] concedes, as he must, that 'nullifiers' may
properly be excluded from the guilt-phase jury.").
Id at 178.
See, for example, State v Ramseur, 106 NJ 123, 524 A2d 188, 296-97 (1987) (O'Hern
concurring) (noting the distinction between 'nullifiers" and "Witherspoon excludables,"
and stating that by definition, the latter "can decide guilt or innocence fairly but are con-
scientiously opposed to voting a fellow citizen to death").
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alty, and presented studies in support of that claim.81 The Court
reasoned that even assuming that, as a class, those who could not
impose the death penalty were less likely to convict, 2 nothing in
the Sixth Amendment prevents a court from culling them from
the guilt-phase jury. It rejected the defendant's "suggestion that
Witherspoon ... [has] broad applicability outside the special con-
text of capital sentencing," and concluded that the decision does
not support a rule that death-qualification before the guilt phase
violates a defendant's right'to an impartial jury." Since Lockhart,
the Court has consistently stated that Witherspoon error does not
entitle a defendant to a new trial, only to resentencing.
What can explain the Court's interest in retaining death-
option-doubters on sentencing juries, but lack of interest in re-
taining guilt-option-doubters on guilt-phase juries? One obvious
answer would be to explain Witherspoon as a product of the
Court's particular concern about the arbitrary imposition of the
penalty of death under the Eighth Amendment, rather than a de-
cision based in the meaning of the "impartial jury" guaranteed by
the Sixth Amendment." The Court, however, has rejected this
easy answer." Instead, the distinction may have other explana-
tions. The Court may consider the kind of decisionmaking in-
volved in a sentencing determination to be entirely different from
the kind involved in a guilt determination. A jury determining
guilt has a less morally complex task to perform than a jury
"Lockhart, 476 US at 171-73.
Id at 173 ("[We will assume for purposes of this opinion that the studies... estab-
lish that 'death-qualification' in fact produces juries somewhat more 'conviction-prone'
than 'non-death-qualified' juries.").
Id at 183.
See Morgan v Illinois, 504 US 719, 739 n 11 (1992). See also Adams v Texas, 448 US
38, 43-45, 50-51 (1980) (reversing imposition of death penalty for Witherspoon error);
Clark v State, 929 SW2d 5, 10 (Tex Crim App 1996), cert denied, 117 S Ct 1246 (1997)
(Witt error demands resentencing, not a new trial.).
"See, for example, Stephen Gillers, Deciding Who Dies, 129 U Pa L Rev 1, 85-89
(1980) (noting that the Court's reliance on the Sixth Amendment is unconvincing and that
the Eighth Amendment provides a more sensible basis for the Witherspoon limitation on
prosecutors); Krauss, 24 Am Crim L Rev at 87-88 (cited in note 15) (describing disagree-
ment within the Supreme Court as to the textual basis for Witherspoon).
"See Wainwright v Witt, 469 US 412,423 (1985):
Witherspoon is not grounded in the Eighth Amendments prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment, but in the Sixth Amendment. Here, as elsewhere, the quest
is for jurors who will conscientiously apply the law and find the facts. That is what an
'impartial' jury consists of, and we do not think, simply because a defendant is being
tried for a capital crime, that he is entitled to a legal presumption or standard that
allows jurors to be seated who quite likely will be biased in his favor.
See also Morgan, 504 US at 731-32 (stating that the Witherspoon-Witt limit on the state's
ability to challenge jurors was based on the concept of impartiality in both the Sixth
Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
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choosing an appropriate sentence, and thus remains impartial
even when jurors who are not sufficiently biased to be excluded
for cause are excluded anyway. A sentencing jury's decision is
less concrete, more discretionary, and more vulnerable to view-
point stacking than is the determination of guilt or innocence."7
Alternatively, the Court may have concluded that the cost of re-
quiring two different juries in capital cases, one which was not
death-qualified for the guilt phase, and one that was for sen-
tencing, simply was too high to credibly impose upon the states as
a federal constitutional command.
Although the Court's death-qualification cases fail to provide
a barrier to efforts to purge nullifiers from juries, Professor Peter
Westen has advanced an additional interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment that might. Professor Westen argues that only a
right to jury nullification embodied in the Sixth Amendment can
explain the tenacious judicial resistance against directed verdicts,
special verdicts, retrials following acquittals in cases containing
egregious legal error, and various other jury controls." If indeed a
defendant's right to a jury free to nullify is lurking somewhere in
the Sixth Amendment,"9 it conceivably could protect a defendant's
"See, for example, Turner v Murray, 476 US 28, 37 (1986), in which Justice White,
joined by three other Justices, found that although the capital defendant's due process
rights were violated when the trial court denied the defendant, accused of an interracial
crime, the opportunity to question jurors on the issue of racial bias, the proper remedy
was resentencing, not retrial. Justice White cited "the broad discretion given the jury at
the death-penalty hearing, and the special seriousness of the risk of improper sentencing
in a capital case." Id at 37. Several years earlier, Professor westen had examined the dif-
ferences between guilt/innocence decisions and sentencing decisions and also concluded
that decisions regarding sentence are different. They are more "finely graded" than the
"either/or" decision at the guilt phase; they are more "fully informed" than the jury's as-
sessment of guilt because the jury understands the consequences of its decisions; and they
are "more open-textured" than guilt/innocence decisions, in that jurors may receive less
detailed instructions concerning the parameters of their decision. Westen, 78 Mich L Rev
at 1022-23 n 68 (cited in note 1). Although Westen listed these differences as reasons to
protect nullification during the guilt phase while suppressing it during sentencing, see id
at 1022-23, the same distinctions arguably support the Court's enhanced concern about
the effects of viewpoint stacking on the sentencing decision.
See Westen, 78 Mich L Rev at 1012-18 (cited in note 1). See also Akhil Reed Amar,
Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple, 106 Yale L J 1807, 1843-46 (1997) (discussing jury
nullification and relying upon Westen).
' Dicta in at least one recent case suggest that the Court may not recognize such a
right. See Strickland v Washington, 466 US 668, 695 (1984) (noting that under the Sixth
Amendment, in assessing whether a defendant has been deprived of the effective assis-
tance of counsel guaranteed him by the Sixth Amendment, a court must review the case
without considering "the possibility of arbitrariness, whimsy, caprice, 'nullification,' and
the like. A defendant has no entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker, even if a
lawless decision cannot be reviewed.").
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interest in retaining nullification sympathizers as jurors, just as
it protects jury autonomy during later phases of the trial2 °
4. Jury nullification as a part of the separation of powers.
Another possible source of constitutional protection against
the exclusion of those who may nullify is the Jury Clause of Arti-
cle III. Professors Akhil Reed Amar and Michael Stokes Paulsen
each have argued that Article III delegated to the jury the power
to decide certain legal questions through its general verdict of ac-
quittal, thus providing a structural check on the power of the ju-
diciary, the legislature, and the executive.9'
This approach has logical appeal. There are very few limits
in the original Constitution that operate directly to protect indi-
vidual citizens other than office holders. The Jury Clause in Arti-
cle I is one of them. It is joined in Article I by the prohibitions
against bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and suspensions of
the writ of habeas corpus,92 and in Article II by the power of par-
don."3 Only the unique power of the criminal sanction warranted
so many different barriers. It makes sense to construe them to-
' Not surprisingly, lower courts do not seem to think so. Decisions considering defense
claims of improper cause rulings have added little clarity to the scope of constitutional
limits on a prosecutor's challenges for cause. Most have not mentioned any of the three
theories described here. Those that have noted the Witherspoon line of cases have dis-
missed those cases as capital cases without explaining why capital cases deserve different
treatment. See, for example, United States v Joseph, 892 F2d 118, 124 (DC Cir 1989) (con-
cluding that erroneous exclusion of a juror for cause does not warrant relief, distinguish-
ing Witherspoon as a case involving death penalty scruples). Occasionally, a court will
grant a new trial due to a judge's erroneous exclusion of a juror for cause. See, for exam-
ple, Zinger v State, 932 SW2d 511, 513-14 (Tex Crim App 1996) (en banc) (holding that the
trial court abused its discretion by excluding for cause a venireperson who admitted an
inability to find guilt based on one witness's testimony, and remanding the case for a new
trial noting the error was not harmless because the state had used all of its peremptory
challenges).
" See Amar, 100 Yale L J at 1182-99 (cited in note 65); Akhil Reed Amar, Sixth
Amendment First Principles, 84 Georgetown L J 641, 682-86 (1996); Michael Stokes Paul-
sen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 Georgetown
L J 217, 288-89 (1994) (arguing that the "jury's exercise of its power to acquit (or not in-
dict) is a jurisdictional bar to the President's law-enforcement powers, no different from
his inability to punish people for breaking state law"). The idea of the jury as an integral
part of the essential checks and balances on governmental power can be traced at least as
far back as Montesquieu, who "was invoked more often than any other political authority
in eighteenth-century America. Perhaps because of the Framers' efforts, his name is most
closely associated with separation of powers" Martin H. Redish, The Constitution as a Po-
litical Structure 105 (Oxford 1995) (Montesquieu admired the English system of petit ju-
ries.). See also W.B. Gwyn, The Meaning of the Separation of Powers: An Analysis of the
Doctrine from Its Origin to the Adoption of the United States Constitution 103 (Tulane
1965).
US Const, Art I, § 9, cls 2 & 3.
US Const, Art H, § 2, cl 1.
[65:433
1998] Silencing Nullification Advocacy
gether, as operating alike-against punishment and in favor of
leniency.
Consider, for example, how the jury's power to acquit resem-
bles the presidential power to pardon. Neither acquittal nor par-
don establishes a precedent for any other case,' neither can be
overturned by the judiciary nor by Congress,95 and both can
achieve the same result: the release of a person guilty of a crimi-
nal offense as defined by the legislature." The jury's check on
punishment is also similar to the power of the executive to refuse
to prosecute: both are assumed to be beyond the reach of judicial
order or legislative mandate, yet neither is expressed in the text
of the Constitution. 7 Professor Amar has observed that the inclu-
See Paulsen, 83 Georgetown L J at 289-90 (cited in note 91) (observing this limita-
tion on jury power).
See Ex parte Grossman, 267 US 87, 121 (1925) (suggesting, in the course of holding
that the President has the power to pardon defendants convicted of contempt of court, that
even if a President were to interfere so greatly with the judiciary as to "deprive a court of
power to enforce its orders," the appropriate remedy would be impeachment rather than a
narrowed interpretation of his constitutionally mandated powers). See also Schick v Reed,
419 US 256, 266-68 (1974) (allowing the President to commute a sentence authorized by
law to one that is not); Exparte Garland, 71 US (4 Wall) 333, 381 (1866) ("It is not within
the constitutional power of Congress thus to inflict punishment beyond the reach of execu-
tive clemency."); Er parte Wells, 59 US (18 How) 307, 315 (1855) (reasoning that the
President has the power to grant a conditional pardon under the Constitution).
" Among some colonists, the power of the jury to dispense mercy appears to have had
stronger support than did the power of the executive to pardon. According to Professor
Kathleen Moore:
[T]he colonists inherited an ambivalence about the place of pardon in a republic.
Many colonists agreed with Montesquieu: If a pardon was to be understood, as it was
in England, as an act of grace, a personal, man-to-man act of forgiveness, then there
could be no executive pardoning power in a democracy, where a crime is an offense
against the people, not an affront to the King.
Kathleen Dean Moore, Pardons: Justice, Mercy, and the Public Interest 25 (Oxford 1989).
Yet this was not the Framers' understanding. According to Moore, the Framers considered
the strategic exercise of the pardoning power necessary to quell insurrection and to induce
an accused person to give testimony against others (as a form of immunity). Id at 26. See,
for example, Walter Flavius McCaleb, The Aaron Burr Conspiracy 338-39 (Dodd Mead
1903) (relating Jefferson's efforts to use pardons to obtain testimony against Aaron Burr).
For other references to the similarities between the pardon power and nullification, see,
for example, Elizabeth T. Lear, Contemplating the Successive Prosecution Phenomenon in
the Federal System, 85 J Crim L & Criminol 625, 662-64 (1995) (comparing the rationales
underlying the power to pardon and the power to retry a case in the face of jury nullifica-
tion); Westen and Drubel, 1978 S Ct Rev at 130 n 230 (cited in note 61) (noting that a
jury's decision to nullify is "no more lawless than a chief executives] authority to pardon
or grant clemency, which is not subject to judicial review").
See In re Confiscation Cases, 74 US 454, 457 (1868) (noting that the district attor-
ney "controls the prosecution... and may, if he sees fit, allow the plaintiffs to become
nonsuit"); Stuart P. Green, Note, Private Challenges to Prosecutorial Inaction: A Model
Declaratory Judgment Statute, 97 Yale L J 488, 489 (1988) (arguing for a statute giving
standing to private persons to challenge decisions of prosecutors not to prosecute and dis-
cussing the constitutional problems of such a statutory scheme). See also United States v
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sion of the Jury Clause in Article III installed the jury as a "lower
judicial house" to check the judiciary in the same way that the
House of Representatives checks the Senate. 8
This separation of powers theory, unlike the individual rights
theories reviewed earlier, provides a response to some of the more
popular arguments against jury nullification. Critics of nullifica-
tion have observed that even if the jury's veto over the law made
sense in early American society, in which jurors were as qualified
as judges to decide legal questions, this is no longer the case. To-
day, any consensus or understanding among jurors about crimi-
nal justice that may have existed once has long since disap-
peared, undermining the original basis for the jury's power.99 Ar-
guably, such concerns about competency are irrelevant to the vi-
tality of the checks and balances in the Constitution. Even if one
believes that sometime during the nineteenth century judges, not
jurors, became the better protectors of individual rights (at the
time that the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified, for example),
the various institutional checks in the Constitution were "de-
signed to function irrespective of who was in power at any given
time .... ,,1oo
Gonzales, 58 F3d 459, 462 (9th Cir 1995) (holding that a denial of government decision to
seek dismissal of a criminal charge would represent an "intrusion upon prosecutional pre-
rogative").
Amar, 100 Yale L J at 1193 (cited in note 65). Other nullification advocates invoke
this concept when they refer to the jury as the "fourth branch." See Letter from Laura
Kriho 1 (Apr 7, 1997) (on file with U Chi L Rev); Dodge, 8:4 FIJActivist at 7 (cited in note
7) (describing jury nullification as establishing the "fourth branch" of government).
"At the time of the Founding, many federal jurors were educated, propertied men
who knew as much law as the judges. See Alschuler and Deiss, 61 U Chi L Rev at 889-97
(cited in note 51) (noting the lack of legal training on state benches in the early 1800s);
Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nineteenth Century, 74 Yale L J 170, 171 n 6
(1964) (noting that the vast majority of judges in Massachusetts between 1692 and 1776
lacked legal training).
Federal crimes were few and simple. Those in favor of broadening control over the
jury's power to acquit argue that jurors can no longer be expected to understand the mas-
sive complexity of federal law, hence the premise for any delegation of power is gone. See,
for example, Leipold, 82 Va L Rev at 291 (cited in note 8); Warshawsky, Note, 85 George-
town L J at 214-15 (cited in note 8) (arguing that juries lack expertise to judge the balance
of moral implications, social and economic policy, and political feasibility reached by leg-
islators). Compare David C. Williams, The Militia Movement and Second Amendment
Revolution: Conjuring with the People, 81 Cornell L Rev 879, 950 (1996) (arguing that the
diversity among Americans has made even the hope of commonality futile).
"Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions Affect Individual Rights: The Other
Nixon v United States, 1993 S Ct Rev 125, 140. The rigid protections of divided powers,
Professor Redish has explained, are prophylactic. Redish, The Constitution as a Political
Structure at 133 (cited in note 91).
Another popular anti-nullification argument is that the jury's ability to use its com-
mon sense has been disabled by limits on evidence, instructions, and argument, and that
allowing jurors unreviewable power to decide criminal cases in any direction is no longer
reasonable, even if the Constitution once granted such power. See Leipold, 82 Va L Rev at
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Grounding nullification in the separation of powers and not
in the Sixth Amendment or in the juror's individual rights also
provides an answer to the claim that allowing a jury to take the
law into its own hands permits it both to undercut the authority
of the legislature to define criminal law and to undermine the
authority of the executive to enforce it.' 0 ' Viewed through the lens
of separation of powers, this is not an objection at all; this is the
point. The ability of the jury to exercise these otherwise primarily
legislative and executive functions explains why the jury is even
mentioned in Article III.
If the jury has unreviewable power to check the legislature
and the executive, and if the Fourteenth Amendment left that
power intact,"2 then efforts to disable that authority through the
303-04 (cited in note 8); Andrew D. Leipold, The Dangers of Race-Based Jury Nullification:
A Response to Professor Butler, 44 UCLA L Rev 109, 129-31 (1996) (arguing that due to
the rules of evidence, jurors don't have the information they need to make reliable judg-
ments about just deserts); Gary J. Simson, Jury Nullification in the American System: A
Skeptical View, 54 Tex L Rev 488, 513 (1976) (arguing that jurors lack information to
make well-reasoned decisions). See also Dale W. Broeder, The Functions of the Jury: Facts
or Fictions?, 21 U Chi L Rev 386, 412 n 131 (1954) (arguing that courts keep information
from jurors that they would need to use nullification power wisely).
"'See Schopp, 69 S Cal L Rev at 2058 (cited in note 5) ("By engaging in nullification,
jurors-who are not democratically elected-reject laws established through a democratic
process in order to apply standards-to which they are not themselves subject-to indi-
viduals who had no opportunity to vote in the process by which these standards were se-
lected."); Simson, 54 Tex L Rev at 517-18 (arguing that "by instructing juries that they
may apply their own view of blameworthy conduct and ignore that codified by Congress,
federal judges could be thought to extend the judicial branch's powers... and to infringe
upon the prescriptive powers granted Congress" and suggesting that jury nullification en-
sures "that federal law is supreme only when juries do not mind enforcing it"); Warshaw-
sky, Note, 85 Georgetown L J at 213-14 (cited in note 8) ("Rlather than being an expres-
sion of democracy, jury nullification is fundamentally antidemocratic."); St. John, Note,
106 Yale L J at 2586-87 (cited in note 5) (arguing that juries are neither representative
nor majoritarian). For arguments that the Framers could not have intended in either Arti-
cle MI or in the Sixth Amendment to perpetuate a system that developed to check an un-
democratic government, see Phillip B. Scott, Jury Nullification: An Historical Perspective
on a Modem Debate, 91 W Va L Rev 389, 418-19 (1989) (arguing that what once made
sense as a reaction to an unrepresentative government no longer makes sense); Simson,
54 Tex L Rev at 508-09 (noting that the "need for protection against unjust laws is pri-
marily a function of the lawmaker's responsiveness to the people's will," and that "the ex-
isting degree of participation by the people in the election process does offer some assur-
ance that the proportion of truly unpopular laws will be small").
l'Professor Amar, the leading contemporary proponent of the jury as a coequal check
on other institutions of the federal government, has suggested that the jury's power was
implicitly qualified by the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. Amar, 100 Yale L J at
1195 (cited in note 65) ("Existence of such a power in local bodies to nullify Congress' Re-
construction statutes might have rendered the Civil War Amendments a virtual dead let-
ter.... [Tihese Amendments implicitly qualified the (equally implicit) power of local juries
to thwart national laws."). The suggestion that the Fourteenth Amendment implicitly re-
pealed the power of the jury, assuming such power once existed, is problematic. The inter-
est of the government or of the victim in a conviction free from nullification is difficult to
characterize as part of the due process guaranteed by that amendment, and the Four-
19981
The University of Chicago Law Review
selection of who sits on the jury could be suspect. The analogy
here would be to an attempt to impose qualifications for office
holders above and beyond those provided in the Constitution, or
an attempt by one branch to manipulate the composition of an-
other."3
While one or more of these last three theories may offer a ba-
sis for limiting the exclusion of potential nullifiers from juries,
subsequent sections will demonstrate that each suffers from the
same serious flaws. First, as Part I.B demonstrates, there is no
historical support, at least in decisions from most of the nine-
teenth century, for any constitutional barrier preventing the ex-
clusion of potential nullifiers from juries in criminal cases. His-
tory aside, as Part I.C discusses, each of the theories that might
create a constitutionally protected zone for nullification fails to of-
fer any basis for deciding which, if any, of the many other limits
on nullification are unconstitutional, potentially threatening a
variety of well accepted practices. Finally, as shown by Part I.D,
the theories offer no guidance for judges to distinguish between
those reasons to nullify that are forbidden, and those that are ac-
ceptable, virtually guaranteeing the arbitrary application of nulli-
fication safeguards.
teenth Amendment is not inevitably incompatible with jury nullification power. Certainly
the local jury's power to acquit slowed the enforcement of federal civil rights statutes just
as it had slowed the enforcement of federal capital crimes before the Civil War. For two
excellent and recent discussions of the refusal of all-white juries to indict and convict
those charged with violence against African-Americans after the Civil War, see Randall
Kennedy, Race, Crime, and the Law 301-03 (Pantheon 1997); Alschuler and Deiss, 61 U
Chi L Rev at 889-97 (cited in note 51). See also Douglas L. Colbert, Challenging the Chal-
lenge: Thirteenth Amendment as a Prohibition Against the Racial Use of Peremptory Chal-
lenges, 76 Cornell L Rev 1, 5 (1990) ("Since the beginning of slavery, the all-white jury has
represented the ultimate obstacle to justice for African-American criminal defendants.");
Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S Cal L Rev 168, 212 (1972)
("The numerous occasions in the South in which white juries acquit white defendants of
crimes against Blacks attest to this [nullification] power in a very dramatic way."). But
jury nullification has not prevented Congress or the federal courts from enforcing the
commands of the Civil Rights Amendments. Professor Amar has suggested to me an alter-
native argument pertaining to how the role of the criminal jury was modified by the Four-
teenth Amendment: by the time the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, the jury's
power to determine the law had eroded so dramatically that whatever the scope of jury
rights incorporated by that amendment to the states, it did not include jury nullification.
" Compare Powell v McCormack, 395 US 486, 549-51 (1969) (holding unconstitutional
a congressional attempt to vote on whether to exclude an elected member). The Article HI
theory also provides an explanation of why nonunanimous verdicts may be constitutional
in state, but not federal, courts. Arguably, Congress is no more able to manipulate the de-
cision rules ofjuries than to shape the decision rules of the Supreme Court.
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B. Past Exclusion of Nullifiers from Juries
Historical accounts of jury nullification have ignored entirely
efforts by courts to select only those jurors who are willing to ap-
ply the law as given to them by the judge. Those who have gath-
ered historical support for and against jury nullification have re-
stricted their inquiry to other nullification controls: judicially
mandated judgments of conviction, special verdicts, review of ac-
quittals, or restrictions on argument, evidence, or instructions."'4
This is a curious gap. Ridding a jury of all possible nullifiers is as
potent a weapon for the judiciary in its efforts to limit nullifica-
tion as are its rulings limiting what a jury can hear during
trial.' If the freedom to nullify is a fundamental right of those
who serve on juries, an entitlement guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights to all defendants, or an essential feature of government
structure under Article III, one might expect some criticism not
only of judicial refusal to tell juries they can nullify, but also of
judicial rulings culling from juries venirepersons who might try.
Instead, the cases tell a different story: purging nullifiers from
juries is an American tradition.
1. Federal practice.
Jury selection practices prevalent in federal courts shortly
after the Constitution's adoption provide some insight into consti-
tutional meaning,"0 ' but unfortunately little is known about the
exclusion of legal skeptics from juries between 1790 and 1820.107
"'Scholarly discussions of nullification often focus on evidence, arguments, and in-
structions alone. See, for example, Abramson, We, the Jury at 64 (cited in note 5) (noting
that the distinction between power and right has "one major practical implication: judges
should not instruct juries about nullification because it is not a power jurors have any law-
ful right to exercise"); Kristen M. Sauer, Note, Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury
About Mandatory Sentencing Consequences, 95 Colum L Rev 1232, 1242-43 & nn 59-70
(1995) (discussing the lack of jury instruction on sentencing consequences); Alan W. Sche-
flin and Jon M. Van Dyke, Merciful Juries: The Resilience of Jury Nullification, 48 Wash
& Lee L Rev 165, 170-73, 183 (1991) (discussing only argument and instruction issues);
Schopp, 69 S Cal L Rev at 2045 (cited in note 5) ("The central explicit debate [about nulli-
fication] involves the manner in which judges should instruct juries regarding their power
to nullify."); Warshawsky, Note, 85 Georgetown L J at 210 (cited in note 8) (' The real issue
in the debate over jury nullification... is whether or not juries should be informed... of
their power to nullify the law.").
"Or, as the Sparf Court itself stated, a court cannot "do indirectly that which it has
no power to do directly." 156 US at 106, quoting United States v Taylor, 11 F 470, 474 (Cir
Ct D Kan 1882).
"See, for example, Sparf, 156 US at 169 (Gray dissenting) ("[U]pon the question of
the true meaning and effect of the Constitution... opinions expressed more than a gen-
eration after the adoption.., have far less weight.").
"There are not many reported opinions in the early years of the Republic containing
references to challenges for cause made by the government. A defendant had no ability to
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The limited descriptions of jury selection in cases prosecuted un-
der the highly controversial Sedition Act of 1798, for example,
contain no references to attempts by prosecutors to exclude jurors
opposed to the law. However, in the earliest reported federal
cases considering government challenges to jurors who disagreed
with the law, courts upheld the exclusion of jurors who had con-
scientious scruples against capital punishment in cases where a
finding of guilt meant the imposition of the death penalty."8 We
know from early case reports that Quakers who opposed convic-
tion when the penalty would be death were excused for cause
from federal cases at least as early as 1820.109
In the decades leading up to the Civil War, federal courts
were the site of several politically and morally charged prosecu-
tions of persons accused of treason based on their alleged resis-
tance to the Fugitive Slave Law. (The alleged fugitives them-
selves were denied a jury trial entirely before losing their liberty
under the law; those obstructing the law's enforcement were
subject to fine and imprisonment, also without jury trial."0 ) Men
appeal a conviction on this basis. See United States v Scott, 437 US 82, 87-88 (1978) (not-
ing that as of the time that the Fifth Amendment was adopted, all final judgments,
whether of acquittal or conviction, were unappealable); Seymour D. Thompson and Edwin
G. Merriam, A Treatise on the Organization, Custody and Conduct of Juries, Including
Grand Juries 268 (Stevenson 1882), noting that:
[NMo exception lies to the action of the court in allowing a challenge. The reason is
that when a competent jury, composed of the requisite number of persons, has been
impaneled and sworn in the case, the purpose of the law has been accomplished. Nei-
ther party can be said to have a vested interest in any juror, therefore, although in
impaneling a jury, one competent person has been rejected, yet, if another equally
competent has been substituted in his stead, no injury has been done. (footnotes
omitted)
See also text accompanying note 138 (noting that rulings on certain challenges for cause
made by triors could not be questioned). ' Triors" are discussed in Part I.B.3.
1
"See United States v McMahon, 26 F Cas 1131, 1131 (Cir Ct DC 1835); United States
v Ware, 28 F Cas 404,404 (Cir Ct DC 1824).
"° See United States v Cornell, 25 F Cas 650, 655-56 (Cir Ct D RI 1820) (opinion by
Story), upholding exclusion of Quakers from jury on grounds that they had conscientious
scruples against capital punishment:
To insist on a juror's sitting in a cause when he acknowledges himself to be under in-
fluences, no matter whether they arise from interest, from prejudices, or from relig-
ious opinions, which will prevent him from giving a true verdict according to law and
evidence, would be to subvert the objects of a trial by jury, and to bring into disgrace
and contempt, the proceedings of courts ofjustice.
See also United States v Wilson, 28 F Cas 699, 701 (Cir Ct E D Pa 1830) (upholding exclu-
sion ofjurors with conscientious scruples against death penalty); People v Ryan, 2 Wheeler
Crim Cas 47,48 (NY Oyer and Terminer 1823) (excusing a Quaker from jury service).
"' See Abelman v Booth, 62 US (21 Howard) 506, 526 (1858), overruling In re Booth, 3
Wisc 68 (1854) (granting writ of habeas corpus releasing petitioner who had obstructed
the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act). For a description of the social turmoil sur-
rounding the enforcement of this law, see generally Stanley W. Campbell, The Slave
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summoned for jury duty in such cases were asked not only
whether they had conscientious scruples about capital punish-
ment that would prevent them from rendering "a verdict of guilty,
death being the punishment, though the evidence required such a
verdict," but were also asked the following question:
Have you formed an opinion that the law of the United
States, known as the 'Fugitive Slave Law' of 1850, is uncon-
stitutional, so that you cannot for that reason, convict a per-
son indicted for a forcible resistance thereto, if the facts al-
leged in the indictment are proved, and the courts hold the
statute to be constitutional?"'
During the Civil War, Congress responded to fears of nullification
in trials of Confederates for treason by insisting in 1862 that, be-
fore service, each juror first swear that he had never given any
aid or comfort to any insurrection or rebellion against the United
States." Nine years later, responding to complaints about the
Catchers: Enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law 1850-1860 (North Carolina 1968); Jane
H. Pease and William L Pease, The Fugitive Slave Law and Anthony Burns: A Problem in
Law Enforcement 11-12 (Lippincott 1975).
... United States v Hanway, 26 F Cas 105, 107 (Cir Ct E D Pa 1851) (concerning the
trial of a man accused of conspiring to violently resist the execution of the Fugitive Slave
Law and assisting in the shooting and beating of a United States Marshal and his men
who were attempting to capture runaway slaves). The efforts to obtain a conviction proved
unavailing in the Hanway case. The defendant, a Quaker and one of fifty-five participants
indicted for treason in connection with the resistance, was acquitted after the judge in-
structed the jury that the treason charges had not been sustained by the evidence.
Charges then were dropped against the remaining defendants. Campbell, The Slave
Catchers at 153-54 (cited in note 110). See also id at 99, 156-57 (relating cases in whichju-
rors acquitted persons charged in connection with resisting the Fugitive Slave Law); Pease
and Pease, Fugitive Slave Law at 19-21 (relating other cases ending in acquittals and
hung juries).
Curiously, at about the same time, some courts in England were rejecting attempts by
the Crown to disqualify jurors because of their suspected hostility to the government. See,
for example, Sawdon's Case, 2 Lewin Crown's Cases 117, 118 (York Sp Assizes 1838)
(opinion by Coleridge) (holding that it was no ground for a challenge for cause that the ju-
ror had sat on several cases previously and had in no instance consented to a verdict for
the Crown).
"Act of June 17, 1862, ch 103, 12 Stat 430, codified at Rev Stat §§ 800-01, 820-21.
Senator Davis stated that:
In the State of Kentucky,... one third of the population... desire[s] the success of
the southern confederacy, and the overthrow of the armies of the United States ....
When we speak to them of duty and obligation to their Government they answer, we
have no Government. When we talk to them of the supremacy of the Constitution,
they say 'the abolitionists have already broken the Constitution, and there is no
longer any Constitution in existence.'... It is for the purpose of winnowing our ju-
ries, grand and petit, and having true and proper men upon them, men who acknowl-
edge their legal and constitutional obligations to support the Government... ; it is to
get men of that character and moral sense upon grand and petit juries that I have at-
tempted to devise this bill.... [I1f we intend to have the laws against treason and
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inability to convict those accused of violence against African-
Americans in the South, Congress barred from juries in civil
rights cases any venireman who would not swear that he had
never even indirectly aided, counseled, or advised a conspiracy to
deny African-Americans their civil rights."3
One might characterize both of these provisions as prohibit-
ing those who break the law from serving rather than prohibiting
those who merely oppose the law. Belief alone, however, proved
enough reason for challenges for cause in a different context-the
federal crusade against bigamy in Utah. In 1878, in a prosecution
for bigamy, the Supreme Court approved of the exclusion of po-
tential jurors who revealed that they had been living in polyg-
amy." Two years later, the Court observed that jurors who be-
lieved that bigamy was not a crime were properly challenged in
such prosecutions."5 Congress followed by enacting a sweeping
statute aimed at bigamy and polygamy, in which it provided that
in any prosecution for bigamy, polygamy, or unlawful cohabita-
tion, courts could challenge for cause any juror who "believes it
right for a man to have more than one living and undivorced wife
at the same time, or to live in the practice of cohabiting with
more than one woman.""'
At least two legislators objected to the extension of disquali-
fication to include mere belief,"' one arguing that excluding such
similar laws executed in the border slave States, we cannot get along without the aid
of such a bill as this.
Cong Globe, 37th Cong, 2d Sess 2620 (1862).
'"Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, ch 22, § 5, 17 Stat 13, 15, codified at Rev Stat §§ 800-01,
822 (1871). See Alschuler and Deiss, 61 U Chi L Rev at 890-91 & n 116 (cited in note 51)
(describing the Act and noting that at the time Klan members pledged "to obtain places on
juries and to vote in favor of fellow members no matter what the evidence"); Kermit L.
Hall, Political Power and Constitutional Legitimacy: The South Carolina Ku Klux Klan
Trials, 1871-1872, 33 Emory L J 921, 937-40 (1984) (describing successful prosecutions of
Klan members after members of the Klan were disqualified from serving as jurors).
SReynolds v United States, 98 US 145, 147, 157 (1878) (upholding the constitutional-
ity of the federal statute authorizing the prosecution of bigamists).
"Miles v United States, 103 US 304, 310-11 (1880) (upholding dismissal of jurors the
Court characterized as biased after they explained that they believed polygamy was or-
dained by God).
"'Act of Mar 22, 1882, ch 47, § 5, 22 Stat 30, 31 ("Edmunds-Tucker Act"), amended by
Act of Mar 3, 1887, ch 397,24 Stat 635, 636, codified at 28 USC § 426 (1925).
... Senator Saulsbury remarked-
[Ilt seems to me it is carrying disqualifications to a very great extent to apply them to
a man simply because he entertains a particular belief, while he may not practice
upon that belief A man might entertain a belief that it was proper and right, if a
man so desired, to have two wives, or if a woman so desired to have two husbands,
and yet not be at all affected in his judgement thereby as to testimony upon which he
was required to pass as a juror.
13 Cong Rec 1207 (1882). During debate on the Senate floor, one senator asked: "Why, if
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persons for cause violated the Constitution,"' but the bill passed
anyway. Subsequently, the Court upheld a conviction for polyg-
amy after the defendant challenged the exclusion of potential
grand jurors who admitted that they believed it right for a man to
have more than one wife."' The power to purge such believers
from juries proved pivotal to the success of the federal effort to
you exclude a man who is prejudiced in favor of a crime, you should not exclude a man no-
toriously prejudiced against it?" Id at 1211 (remarks of Senator Pendleton). The response
of the bill's sponsor, Senator Edmunds, to this question is especially interesting as an ex-
ample of the assumption that nullification has no place in federal juries:
Every juror in every political community is supposed to believe in the law, in the gov-
ernment that he is living under, and therefore the idea is that you are not to carry on
a government by putting it in the hands of its enemies; and so it is that in every case
of a juror, you exclude him for bias and so on and so on; and therefore in the sense in
which some people talk about it every jury that is challenged at all is packed; that is
to say it must be a jury that believes that the law that it is executing is a law that it
has a right to execute and ought to execute. That is the distinction.
Id at 1211. Continuing, Senator Edmunds explained:
The horse-thief may not sit on the jury where a horse-thief is on trial, if he says on
being asked that he thinks horse-stealing is a Christian duty; and yet some people
have talked to us the idea that if you exclude horse-thieves from a jury that is to try a
horse-thief you have packed the jury. That is not the case unless it be that every jury
is packed in a sense. As I said some time ago, each jury, like every other agency of
government, must believe in the law that they are called upon to enforce; otherwise
the law itself becomes a mere mockery, and trial by jury a sham. You must in that
sense pack it upon one side or the other; and upon which side? If you are to have a
government at all, you must pack it on the side of the people who believe in the law
that they are sworn when they take their places in the jury-box that they will faith-
fully and impartially execute. That has existed without statute at the common law; it
is the common law now; it is the law of the United States in Utah now, and this jury
clause that we have in this bill only puts into form and provides convenient methods
of carrying out exactly what the Supreme Court of the United States has decided that
the law now is.
Id at 1213.
""As Representative Tucker of Virginia explained in the course of discussing Senate
Bill 353:
The court says it must be guarded against the process known as "packing juries," and
that the man should be tried by persons without prejudice against him.... Now, I do
not mean to say that persons in pari delicto with the accused should be put upon his
jury. But I do mean to say that the fact that a man has been guilty of an offense at a
time long past is no reason for his disfranchisement as a juror, nor to debar the ac-
cused from having him on a jury. And yet this bill does this.... But it goes further. It
dives into the heart of the juryman, and disqualifies him for his belief....
Is [this law] not unconstitutional in that it excludes large classes of men who may not
only never have offended against any law, but who may have abandoned a practice of
which they once were guilty, and who, in many cases, might fairly administer the law
without regard to any higher law supposed to govern the Mormon people?
Id at 1872.
" Clawson v United States, 114 US 477, 481-84 (1885).
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crush polygamy in the Utah Territory and to the ultimate accep-
tance of the State of Utah into the Union.'
In 1892, just three years before Sparf, the Supreme Court
considered a defendant's claim to relief based on the decision of
the trial judge to exclude a juror who had stated that he had con-
scientious scruples regarding the death penalty. 2' The Court's
opinion contained no hint that the Constitution supported such a
claim, declaring simply: "A juror who has conscientious scruples
on any subject, which prevent him from standing indifferent be-
tween government and the accused, and from trying the case ac-
cording to the law and the evidence, is not an impartial juror.""2
When the mandatory nature of the sentence of death was later
removed by Congress in 1897, federal courts continued to exclude
those opposed to the death penalty from juries in capital cases
with challenges for cause, on the theory that allowing jurors with
scruples against the death penalty to remain "would result in
practical immunity from murder.""3
Obviously, in their time, these prosecutions of seditionists,
abolitionists, Confederates, Klansmen, Mormons, and capital de-
fendants generated plenty of outrage in some quarters. Enough
outrage, it seems, to have contributed to hung juries and jury ac-
quittals, not to mention noncooperation by sympathetic wit-
nesses, jail breaks, and other community-assisted escapes. The
judges that excluded the law's critics for cause in these cases of-
ten were not representing local popular will.' 4 Still, all told, there
is very little in this chronology of federal jury selection practice
that would suggest that federal judges, or even most members of
' See, for example, Michael W. Homer, The Judiciary and the Common Law in Utah:
A Centennial Celebration, Utah Bar J 13, 16 (Aug/Sept 1996). Ridding the territory of po-
lygamy was considered by many to be a precondition for statehood. See, for example, 18
Cong Rec 593 (1887) (on the floor of the House, Representative Tucker asked, "Shall the
fair and pure sisterhood of these American States ever permit a polygamous sister to sit
with them at the fireside of our great Union?,' to which several members responded, "No!
no!"). One source reports that, under the Edmunds-Tucker Act, between 1882 and 1890
there were about 2,200 convictions for unlawful cohabitation, but only half a dozen convic-
tions for polygamy, which was harder to prove. Theodore Schroeder, Polygamy and the
Constitution 2 (1906), reprinted in The Arena (Nov 1906).
'
2 Logan v United States, 144 US 263, 298 (1892).
"'Id.
"See United States v Puff, 211 F2d 171, 185 (2d Cir 1954) (interpreting the effect of
the 1897 amendments to 18 USC § 1111(b), providing for qualified verdicts in prosecutions
for murder, enacted to allow juries to spare some defendants from the death penalty). See
notes 20-22 for more recent federal cases upholding challenges for cause due to doubts
about the law.
"See, for example, Robert M. Cover, Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial
Process (Yale 1975) (examining judicial belief and behavior regarding the enforcement of
slave laws before the Civil War).
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Congress, ever considered the government's ability to challenge a
juror for cause during voir dire to be limited by the Constitution.
2. State practice.
State decisions from the 1800s also reflect the regular dis-
qualification of individuals with predispositions against particu-
lar laws. Veniremen with conscientious scruples against the in-
fliction of capital punishment were excused routinely in cases in
which those scruples might affect their ability to convict."2
An 1853 Illinois murder case provides a typical example."2
One juror stated that he would insist on an eyewitness before he
could convict, while another juror stated that:
[H]e should be very reluctant to render a verdict of guilty of
an offence punishable with death, even if his judgment was
convinced of the prisoner's guilt; that he would probably be
the last juror to agree to such a verdict, but he did not know
but that he might be starved to render it; he thought he
should hang the jury, and thus defeat a verdict of guilty. 27
The court explained why such jurors were properly excused:
It would be but a mockery to go through the forms of a trial,
with such a person upon the jury. The prisoner would not be
convicted, however conclusive the proof of his guilt. And al-
though these jurors did not profess to entertain scruples to
the same extent, yet neither of them was competent to try
See, for example, Waller v State, 40 Ala 325, 331 (1867) (upholding the exclusion of a
juror who opposed capital punishment from a case in which death was a possible sen-
tence); Murphy v State, 37 Ala 142, 147 (1861) ("[It is a good challenge for cause ... that
the juror has a fixed opinion against capital or penitentiary punishments."); Walter v Peo-
ple, 32 NY 147, 161 (1865) ("[If the juror conscientiously entertained opinions that would
preclude him from finding a party guilty of an offense punishable with death, it was a
good ground for challenge for principal cause.'); Commonwealth v Lesher, 17 Serg & Rawle
155, 156 (Pa 1828) ("Any one, who, in any possible way, no matter how honestly, has been
warped by any preconceived opinion which may affect his verdict, or has made up his
mind what verdict he is to give, and declared it, is excluded."); Caldwell v State, 41 Tex 86,
93 (1874) (arguing that a juror's conscientious scruples concerning the infliction of death
for a crime can be sufficient grounds for disqualification). See also Albert W. Brickwood, 1
Brickwood's Sackett on Instructions to Juries Containing a Treatise on Jury Trials and
Appeals § 24 at 14, § 52 at 36-37 (Callaghan 3d ed 1908) (noting that a juror can be ex-
cluded for "conscientious scruples against the infliction of punishment or of the death pen-
alty in particular, or against the bringing of any action at law whatever"); Francis Whar-
ton, A Treatise on Criminal Pleading and Practice § 664 (Kay 9th ed 1889) (noting that
persons with conscientious scruples against the death penalty were not qualified to serve
as jurors in murder cases).
Gates v People, 14 M1 433 (1853).
Id at 434. On the early American practice of withholding food from jurors until they
agreed on a verdict, see King, 94 Mich L Rev at 2679 (cited in note 29).
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the case. Their minds were not in a condition to decide the
issue according to the law and the evidence.... Persons thus
indisposed to execute the laws should never be called upon
as jurors to administer them. It would be an idle ceremony to
swear such men... 12
State courts found disqualification justified in a variety of
circumstances. Several states disqualified jurors with conscien-
tious scruples against basing a conviction on circumstantial evi-
dence.'29 In one Texas case from 1877, the court explained that in
cases where a white man is accused of murdering an African-
American man, prosecutors must be allowed to strike for cause
jurors "who feel and believe, morally, socially, politically, or re-
ligiously, that it is not murder for a white man to take the life of
a negro with malice aforethought."3 ' Similarly, during prohibi-
tion, state jurors refused to convict defendants charged with liq-
uor law violations,' leading prosecutors to inquire about opposi-
'Gates, 14 IMI at 434-35. The Gates decision appears in Illinois just at the time criti-
cism surfaced concerning the statutory delegation of questions of both law and fact to ju-
rors. See Howe, Note, 52 Harv L Rev at 611-12 (cited in note 53) (citing Illinois cases from
the period 1859 to 1887).
'See Smith v State, 55 Ala 1, 8-9 (1876) (holding that a person who will not reach a
decision to convict for murder based on circumstantial evidence is incompetent to serve as
a juror); People v Ah Chung, 54 Cal 398, 402 (1880) (same); Jones v State, 57 Miss 684, 685
(1880) (same); State v West, 69 Mo 401, 402-04 (1879) (same); State v Bunger, 11 La Ann
607, 607-08 (La 1856) (holding that a juror's refusal to be swayed by circumstantial evi-
dence is grounds for a challenge for cause); State v Pritchard, 15 Nev 74, 79 (1880) (hold-
ing that a juror who will not vote to sentence a defendant to death when conviction is
based only on circumstantial evidence is incompetent); Commonwealth v Heist, 14 Pa C
239, 240 (1893) (same); Shafer v State, 7 Tex Ct App 239, 241 (1879) (same). See also
James D. Rice, Crime and Punishment in Frederick County and Maryland, 1748-1837: A
Study in Culture, Society, and Law 263-64 (dissertation 1994) (on file with U Chi L Rev)
(relating that in an 1831 murder trial, the prosecutor asked each juror "whether he had
conscientious scruples about convicting in a case of life and death on circumstantial testi-
mony alone"). Rice noted that juries often returned verdicts of guilty against their con-
sciences, due to what they expressed as their legal duty to do so. See id at 283-86. This is
particularly significant in Maryland, as the courts in that state afforded juries greater
power to decide the law than elsewhere.
'Lester v State, 2 Tex Ct App 432, 442-43, 29 Tex App 63, 69-72 (1877), overruled on
other grounds, Leeper v State, Tex App 63, 69-72, 14 SW 398, 399-400 (Tex Ct App 1890)
(noting that the mere disqualification of a trial juror is not grounds for a new trial absent
a showing of probable injury to the defendant). See also Carter u State, 39 Tex Crim 345,
356-57, 48 SW 508, 511 (Tex Crim App 1898) (reaffirming the validity of the ruling fi
Lester); Commonwealth v Buccieri, 153 Pa 535, 547-48, 26 A 228, 233 (1893) (holding that
a juror was properly disqualified when he insisted that whoever committed the crime
charged was presumably not sane). Compare Beck v Beck, 163 Pa 649, 649-50, 30 A 236,
236 (1894) (upholding actions of trial judge who permitted counsel in a divorce case to de-
termine whether the jurors were "conscientiously opposed to the granting of divorces").
131 See Kalven and Zeisel, The American Jury at 76, 291-92 & n 10 (cited in note 1)
(terming the jury's systematic nullification of the Prohibition laws during the 1920s "the
most intense example of jury revolt in recent history" and noting that acquittal rates in
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tion to such laws during voir dire and to challenge jurors on this
basis.'32 Significantly, this practice of screening from juries those
with doubts about the law took place even in Indiana, where the
state constitution recognized the right of the jury in a criminal
case to determine the law.' 33
Disqualification during voir dire was not the states' only tool
for excluding nullifiers from juries. Until the middle of the twen-
tieth century local sheriffs, judges, or jury commissioners often
had discretion to choose whom to summon for jury service, discre-
tion that may have enabled them to cull criminal law skeptics
from the jury pool at an early stage." The constitutional chal-
lenges that eventually brought down these traditional jury selec-
tion practices were not claims concerning the wrongful exclusion
of nullifiers, but claims of race and gender discrimination. 5
3. Triors and their power.
There is, however, one very interesting twist to jury selection
that persisted until the late nineteenth century, and that seems
to fit well with the separation of powers theory of nullification:
the use of triors. At common law, a party could challenge a poten-
tial juror by alleging that the venireman possessed an undeclared
belief that might affect his verdict. This challenge was termed a
federal trials for liquor violations ranged from 13 to 60 percent, depending on region).
'See State v Carson, 131 SC 42, 126 SE 757, 758 (1925) (upholding trial court's deci-
sion to allow state to ask jurors about their views on Prohibition); McClure v State, 103
Tex Crim 158, 159, 280 SW 784, 784-85 (Tex Crim App 1926) (sustaining peremptory
challenge to juror who stated he was prejudiced against whisky law).
"'Compare, for example, Driskill v State, 7 Ind 338, 342 (1855) (disqualifying jurors
with conscientious scruples about the death penalty), and Greenley v State, 60 Ind 141
(1877) (same), with Ind Const, Art I, § 19 ("[n all criminal cases whatever, the jury shall
have the right to determine the law and the facts."). See generally Howe, Note, 52 Harv L
Rev at 614 n 126 (cited in note 53) (noting the increasing reluctance of Indiana courts to
apply amended provision of Indiana Constitution literally).
'See, for example, King, 94 Mich L Rev at 2692 n 73 (cited in note 29) (noting that
jury commissioners in Los Angeles in the 1940s interviewed prospective jurors in order to
weed out those who had "a wrong conception of government or law enforcement"); id at
2746 n 260 (noting that in the late 1800s, New York jurors were required to answer the
question: "Would you, being a juror, and being charged by the court upon a point of law,
and knowing this point of law to be unsound, decline to accept the ruling?."). Federal
courts used the jury lists generated by the state court systems until quite recently; federal
qualification standards were no more protective of jury power than state standards. Com-
pare David J. Bodenhamer, The Pursuit of Justice: Crime and Law in Antebellum Indiana
83 (Garland 1986) (noting that in the 1850s "the procedures used to select Indiana trial
juries operated to defeat the elaborate justifications employed in defense of an unfettered
jury," and describing use of bystander jurors); id at 88 (noting that even in Indiana, "a
state which defined jury power more broadly than most antebellum states, juries were
never as dominant as theory allowed").
'See King, 94 Mich L Rev at 2694-95 (cited in note 29).
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"challenge to the favor."" 6 When contested, this allegation of bias
was tried in open court, not before the judge, but before "triors"
(or, often, "triers")-two or three laymen who listened to testi-
mony and determined whether the challenged venireman actu-
ally possessed the belief alleged by the challenger.
The usual practice, when triors were appointed, was for the
court, in the first instance, no juror having been sworn, to
name any two unexceptionable persons. When one juror had
been procured, he acted as a trior with the two who had
passed upon his qualifications, or any other two selected by
the court, in deciding, if necessary, upon the next juror
called. When two jurors had been procured, they acted as the
triors of the remaining ten.... It is the province of the court,
upon a challenge to the favor, to say what evidence is admis-
sible for the consideration of the triors; but its sufficiency or
insufficiency, as establishing the challenge, is for the triors
alone to determine.'37
This division of power resulted in the jurors themselves, not
the judge, deciding whether a potential juror was so opposed to
the prosecution or to the defense that he was unqualified to serve.
The triors' decision that a person was or was not competent to
serve, like other findings of fact, was not subject to review by the
court. 3s Triors thus had unreviewable, though limited, power to
determine who could sit in judgment on a criminal case. The ac-
ceptance of this system offers some support for the idea that the
triors, as jurors, served to check the ability of the judge and
'The challenge was one of two types of challenges propter affectum. Aside from the
challenge to the favor, courts recognized a "principle challenge" based on a relationship to
the parties or the case, or on a prior statement by the prospective juror on the merits. See
William Blackstone, 3 Commentaries on the Laws of England 363-64 (Chicago 1979). The
validity of a principle challenge was decided by the court; the challenge to the favor, by
triors. Id. See also Thompson and Merriam, A Treatise on Organization at 170-71, 213-14
(cited in note 107):
'Thompson and Merriam, A Treatise on Organization at 249-50 (cited in note 107)
(footnotes omitted). See also People v Dewick, 2 Parker Crim Rep 230, 233 (NY 1853) (de-
scribing process); Conductor Generalis, or the Office, Duty and Authority of Justices of the
Peace, High-Sheriffs, Under-Sheriffs, Gaolers, Coroners, Constables, Jury Men, Over-Seers
of the Poor, and Also the Office of Clerks of Assize and of the Peace 297-99 (Andrew Brad-
ford 1722), reprinted as Justices and Juries in Colonial America: Two Accounts, 1680-1722
(Arno 1972) ("When the Jurors appear and are called, each Party has Liberty to take his
Challenge ... to the Polls... or to the Favour, as renders the Juror unfit and incompleat
to try the Cause; and the Challenged being confessed, or found true by some of the rest of
the Jury, that incompetent Person is withdrawn.") (emphasis omitted).
See Thompson and Merriam, A Treatise on Organization at 212 (cited in note 107).
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prosecutor to manipulate jury outcomes through juror chal-
lenges. 1
39
Triors in federal cases continued to decide challenges to veni-
remen by both the government and the defense for decades after
the founding.40 As early as 1820, however, some federal judges
were employing this procedure less rigorously. That year, Justice
Story upheld a conviction after the trial judge had dispensed with
triors to assess challenges to Quakers who had voiced their objec-
tions to the death penalty in a capital case.' Congress soon pro-
vided that all jury challenges in the federal courts would be tried
'One might argue that because the defendant could waive triors by failing to contest
the government's allegation of bias, this procedure actually fits more easily within the de-
fendant's-right theory of nullification. But the triors, like the jury itself, were not, origi-
nally at least, the defendant's to waive. If any evidence would be taken on the allegation,
it had to be taken before triors, just as all felony trials at one time had to be before juries.
"See, for example, United States v McMahon, 26 F Cas 1131, 1131 (Cir Ct DC 1835)
(noting that after the United States Attorney had challenged for favor a panel member
who had revealed conscientious opposition to the death penalty that would prevent him
from convicting a man of a capital crime, the "[tiwo first sworn jurors were sworn as triors,
'well and truly to try whether James Friend stands indifferent between the United States
and the prisoner at the bar;' and they found that he did not; having heard the declaration
which he had just made to the court; and thereupon he was set aside); United States v
Watkins, 28 F Cas 419, 477 (Cir Ct DC 1829) (discussing triors' examination of two jurors
challenged for favor by the defendant and the rejection of one when the triors could not
agree); id at 482-83 (At a second trial, the jurors from the former panel were tried by the
triers after being challenged for favor for having already formed an opinion.).
One fascinating exchange occurred in the trial of James Callander in 1800 for sedi-
tious libel in front of Justice Samuel Chase. When the defendant raised an objection to the
array based on information that one of the jurors had expressed an opinion about guilt,
the following exchange took place:
Judge Chase: My construction of the law is quite the contrary. I have always seen tri-
ers sworn to decide these questions. How is this done in your country? Challenges for
favour must be decided by triers. I suppose there must be triers sworn.
Mr. Nicholas: I believe the books lay down this distinction. Challenges to the array
are either principal challenges, or challenges for favour;--causes for principal chal-
lenges are always tried by the court; challenges for favour are always tried by triers.
Judge Chase: Well, sir, your challenge is for favour, because you state the juror to be
unfavorable to the traverser.
Mr. Nicholas: This book states it as a cause of principal challenge.
Judge Chase: Show me that book: it is not the best authority. Have you Coke upon
Littleton in the house? IfI had it we would see the whole doctrine at once. I am per-
suaded that Coke upon Littleton states, that challenges for favour must be decided by
triers. The oath of the triers is laid down there.
Trial of James Thompson Callender For A Seditious Libel, in Francis Wharton, State Tri-
als of United States 688, 696 (Corey & Hart 1849). The use of triors was also discussed
during the prosecution of Aaron Burr. Voluntary withdrawals by the challenged jurors ob-
viated the trial of challenges. See J.J. Coombs, The Trial ofAaron Burr for High Treason
14-20 (Morrison 1864).
' United States v Cornell, 25 F Cas 650, 655-56 (Cir Ct D RI 1820).
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by the court without the aid of triors, and the Supreme Court in
1878 declared that a juror's impartiality was a question of "mixed
law and fact" for the judge to decide.'42 Nevertheless, some federal
courts late into the nineteenth century continued to follow local
procedures that required triors.' 4
The use of triors in state courts also continued through at
least the first half of the nineteenth century.' For example, in
1856, the Supreme Court of Louisiana reversed a conviction be-
cause the court refused to appoint triors to determine a contested
challenge, noting that:
[A]lthough such a request is unusual in this State, we think
it should be allowed upon the request of the prisoner. It was
the English practice, and our statute of 1805 adopted the
common law of England as a guide in criminal procedure.
"2Reynolds v United States, 98 US 145, 156-57 (1878), citing Rev Stat § 819, 17 Stat
282 (1872) (upholding bigamy conviction after trial court granted government's challenge
ofjurors who admitted they were living in polygamy on grounds that in federal courts "all
challenges are tried by the court without the aid of triors"); Harrison v United States, 163
US 140, 142 (1896), quoting Rev Stat § 819 as providing that "[all challenges, whether to
the array or panel, or to individual jurors for cause or favor, shall be tried by the court
without the aid of triors." See also Ex parte McClusky, 40 F 71, 75 (Cir Ct D Ark 1889)
(noting in dicta that the "court may be substituted for triers to dispose of challenges to ju-
ries").
" See Lewis v United States, 146 US 370, 376-77 (1892) ("There is no statute of the
United States which prescribes the method of procedure in impaneling jurors in criminal
cases, and it is customary for the United States courts in such cases to conform to the
methods prescribed by the statutes of the States."). For example, in one of the early big-
amy prosecutions to reach the Supreme Court, the prosecutor's challenge to two venire-
men had been "found ... true" by three triors after each of the challenged jurors had testi-
fied that polygamy was ordained by God and that he who acted on such divine revelations
should not be convicted by the law of the land. Miles v United States, 103 US 304, 306-07
(1880). In upholding the conviction, the Court noted that under the law of the Utah Terri-
tory, the decision of the triors on the impartiality of the challenged jurors was final. Id at
310. See also Hopt v Utah, 110 US 574, 578-79 (1884) (reversing conviction from the Utah
Territory due to the defendant's absence from the hearing at which the triors took evi-
dence on juror challenges, reasoning that the court had no power to dispense with Utah's
statutory requirement that a felony defendant be present at all stages of his trial). By
1882, the antipolygamy statute, discussed above, provided that a potential juror who ap-
pears to practice polygamy may be questioned about these practices under oath, and the
decision to disqualify "shall be tried by the court." 22 Stat at 30-31 (1882). See also 36
Stat 1164, ch 12, §§ 287-88 (1911), codified at 28 USC § 1870 (1994), still providing to-
day: "All challenges, whether to the array or panel, or to individual jurors for a cause or
favor, shall be tried by the court without the aid of triors." Id.
'"See Thompson and Merriam, A Treatise on Organization at 267 n 4 (cited in note
107) (listing statutes in Nevada, Minnesota, Oregon, Utah, and California still requiring
triors as of the 1870s). For a detailed description of the use of triors in New York prior to
1831, see Charles Edwards, The Juryman's Guide Throughout the State of New York 84-86




Such also seems to be the practice in other States of the Un-
ion.14
5
By the latter part of the nineteenth century, however, most state
courts, like the federal courts, had abandoned triors and allowed
judges to decide challenges for cause.'46 In 1893, the high court of
Louisiana explained why the earlier entitlement to triors had be-
come obsolete: "We do not think it is in contemplation of the law
as now framed, particularly to those conferring jurisdiction upon
courts, to leave the determination of any question wholly to any
'"State v Bunger, 11 La Ann 607, 609 (La 1856), quoted in State v Porter, 45 La Ann
661, 12 S 832, 833 (La 1893). See also People v Honeyman, 3 Denio 121, 122-23 (NY 1846)
(involving triors used to decide challenge for favor by the defendant); State v Easter, 30
Ohio St 542, 548 (1876) ("If taken at the proper time, the question whether the juror was
indifferent or not would have been tried by the triers . .. ."). In the 1890s, Minnesota con-
tinued to require triors in capital cases and in cases in which the parties did not consent to
have the challenge tried by the court. See State v Smith, 78 Minn 362, 363-64, 81 NW 17,
17 (1899) (holding that the court may try the challenge when both parties consent in non-
capital cases); State v Durnam, 73 Minn 190, 75 NW 1127, 1128-29 (1898) (upholding con-
viction of a Minneapolis alderman for bribery after a court had tried several challenges to
certain jurors on the ground of actual bias, stating that the 'decision of triors is not re-
viewable, and the same is true of the decision of the court when it acts in place of triors").
'"See, for example, Solander v People, 2 Colo 48, 58-60 (1873) (noting that triors de-
cided "the question of indifferency," but noting that in "modem practice triers have not
been called, and the fact, as well as the law, has been determined by the court," and that
under recent statutory law, the sufficiency of a challenge to the favor must be decided by
the court; in short, the court "performs the office of triers at the common law"); Spies v
People, 122 111 1, 256-65, 12 NE 865, 988-93 (1887) (detailing the court's evaluation of a for
cause challenge to a juror in a murder trial); Coughlin v People, 144 11 140, 165, 33 NE 1,
8 (1893) ("In this State, triers are not appointed, according to the mode of procedure at
common law, all challenges, by our practice, being determined by the court."); State v Vick,
132 NC 995, 997-98, 43 SE 626, 627 (1903) (explaining that the North Carolina legislature
changed the traditional practice of using triors and holding that "by statute in this state
the court is constituted the trier"), citing NC Code §§ 405, 1199 (1883). See also Hagans v
State, 77 Ga App 513, 514-15, 48 SE2d 700, 702 (1948) (stating that at common law a
challenge to the favor "was decided by [triors] (not the court), whose decision was final and
conclusive; but under our system the court is substituted for the triors and the court's de-
cision on a challenge to favor is likewise final and conclusive 'as to the credibility of
proof'") (citation omitted); Butler v Glen Falls Railroad Co, 121 NY 112, 116-18, 24 NE
187, 190 (1890) ("[Bly comparatively recent amendments to the law, the court is now the
sole trier of all challenges, whether for principal cause or to the favor."); Dew v McDivitt,
31 Ohio St 139, 141-42 (1876) (noting that an 1873 act stated that challenges for cause
shall be determined by the court); State v Baldwin, 2 SC (3 Brev) 406, 408-09 (1813)
(holding that "the ancient mode of proceeding by triors has long since been done away
[with]" (opinion by Colcock) and that "whatever mode was formerly pursued to convince
the minds of the triors, is now to be followed to inform the mind of the court" (opinion by
Nott)); McGowan v State, 17 Tenn (9 Yer) 184, 193 (1836) (concluding that the judge "un-
der our system is the trier of the competency of the juror"). See generally Thompson and
Merriam, A Treatise on Organization at 171 (cited in note 107) (noting that seven states
and two territories retained the use of triors in the 1880s).
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agency not judicial."47 This eclipse of triors coincided with a gen-
eral shift of power away from jurors to judges."4
It is one thing to recognize that, during this intriguing chap-
ter of the history of jury trials, the people, not the judge, checked
the government's challenges for cause. It is quite another thing to
conclude that the Constitution was the source of their authority
to do so. I could find no record of any judge or defendant sug-
gesting that the shift from triors to judges violated constitutional
principles. Significantly, other efforts to limit the power of the
common law jury did prompt constitutional objections. For exam-
ple, directed verdicts, new trials, and appeals in criminal
cases'4 -- extended to defendants as protection against lawless
convictions-were denied to prosecutors, thus insulating and fa-
cilitating lawless acquittals.150 Given the asymmetry of these
other novel limits on jury power, the complete elimination of tri-
ors is striking. No attempt was made to protect nullification
through jury selection, say by allowing judges to second guess tri-
ors only when their decision favored the prosecution. Instead, the
judge acquired the last word on all challenges for cause.'
.47 State v Porter, 45 La Ann 661, 661-63, 12 S 832, 833 (La 1893).
" See Alschuler and Deiss, 61 U Chi L Rev at 903-28 (cited in note 51) (describing the
shift in judicial control over juries in the nineteenth century, and collecting explanations
for that shift).
"'Appellate remedies were much more limited before the early 1800s. The Constitu-
tion did not provide for direct review of federal criminal cases, nor did the Judicial Act of
1789. If a federal court decided to uphold a federal criminal statute as constitutional when
it arguably was not, the only recourse of a defendant was to jury nullification, and, if the
jury did not acquit, to the same judge or judges through the motion for new trial, to the
Supreme Court's habeas jurisdiction, or to the executive's pardon. See generally David
Rossman, 'Were There No Appeal": The History of Review in American Criminal Courts, 81
J Crim L & Criminol 518, 518, 554-55 (1990) (discussing debates over the government's
ability to appeal federal acquittals).
'For an early new trial case, see People v Croswell, 3 Johnson Cas 337 (NY Sup Ct
1804) (involving new trial, argued by Alexander Hamilton, and discussed in Sparf, 156 US
at 147 (Gray dissenting)). See also United States v Taylor, 11 F 470, 471-74 (Cir Ct D Kan
1882) (holding that directed verdicts of guilt are not permissible in criminal cases); State v
Reynolds, 5 Tenn 353, 4 Hayw 110, 110-11 (1837) ("A writ of error will lie for the defen-
dant, but not against him" due to the common law bar against being "brought twice into
jeopardy for one and the same offense."); Note, The Changing Role of the Jury in the Nine-
teenth Century, 74 Yale L J 170, 183-85 (1964) (discussing the development of directed
verdicts in Massachusetts).
1 Canadian courts today continue to use triors to decide challenges for cause. Two ve-
nirepersons are randomly chosen and sworn as triors until the first juror is chosen. Then
that juror and the second trior act as triors until the second juror is chosen; then the first
and second jurors act as triors until the third juror is chosen----"a form of 'round robin' pro-
cedure whereby the jurors form successive two-person mini-juries to render verdicts on the
challenge." Neil Vidmar and Julius Melnitzer, Juror Prejudice: An Empirical Study of a
Challenge for Cause, 22 Osgoode Hall L J 487, 498 (1984). The triors remain seated in the
jury box and deliberate their verdicts of "impartial" or "not impartial" in view of the whole
court, each challenge taking about twenty minutes. Id. Vidmar and Melnitzer's study of
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In sum, judicial practices regarding jury selection reflect no
recognition that the Constitution (originally, or as amended after
the Civil War) limited a court's ability to excuse potential nullifi-
ers from criminal juries with challenges for cause. Although tri-
ors once had the ability to protect juror independence, the usur-
pation of their power raised no constitutional eyebrows. Yet his-
tory is only one guide to constitutional principles. Particularly
when judicial power itself is at stake, one might be hesitant to
rely on past judicial practice and pronouncements as the sole
sources of constitutional meaning. With this in mind, the next
two Parts examine independent reasons not to extend more ro-
bust constitutional protection to jury nullification.
C. The Threat to Existing Nullification Controls
Apart from its novelty, a constitutional ban on the exclusion
of nullifiers from juries would raise difficult problems of scope.
The various theories that could regulate the challenge of poten-
tial nullifiers could not be confined easily to the jury selection
phase of trial. Other nullification controls may become difficult to
justify once one decides the Constitution prevents courts from
barring legal dissenters from juries. The range of nullification
control techniques potentially available to judges includes, in ap-
proximate order of severity: (1) preemption of jury acquittals
though the outright denial of a jury determination or through the
entry of a judgment or partial judgment of conviction before,
during, or after a jury trial; (2) ordering new trials after acquit-
tals or inconsistent verdicts through motions for new trial and
appeal; (3) reducing the opportunity for the jury to acquit against
the evidence by asking it to return special findings of fact rather
than a general verdict; (4) allowing the government to preclude a
defendant from relitigating factual findings of a prior jury; (5)
sabotaging the jury's ability to acquit by allowing litigants to re-
move criminal law skeptics with peremptory challenges or chal-
lenges for cause, dismissing such jurors during the trial, or pun-
ishing them after the trial; (6) issuing instructions to the jury
that forbid nullification, omit lesser offenses unsupported by the
evidence, order jurors to continue deliberations once deadlocked,
or include factual interrogatories to supplement the verdict that
might reduce the potential for nullification; (7) refusing to allow
the exercise of challenges for cause in one notorious child abuse case shows that the triors'
decisions coincided significantly with that of an observing psychologist and a defense at-
torney. This led Vidmar and Melnitzer to conclude that "triors are reasonably competent
in distinguishing between veniremen who are and who are not impartial." Id at 510.
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the jury to hear argument or evidence that might lead them to
acquit despite sufficient proof of guilt; and (8) limiting the infor-
mation jurors receive about nullification outside the courtroom.'52
Presently, some of these controls, including the exclusion of nulli-
fiers, are used routinely. Others have been condemned by the Su-
preme Court as violations of the Fifth Amendment's Double
Jeopardy Clause or the Sixth Amendment's Jury Clause.5 ' The
present distinction between acceptable and unacceptable jury
controls in criminal cases follows roughly from the narrowest in-
terpretation of the nullification power reviewed earlier-that jury
nullification is tolerated only because attempting to correct or
prevent juries from making legal errors would infringe upon the
jury's rightful authority to decide all of the facts in a criminal
case and would deprive the criminal defendant of the benefits of
finality once a verdict of acquittal has been returned."5 To find
that the Constitution forbids the exclusion of jurors who disagree
with the law from criminal juries would require acknowledging
an entirely different theory of the jury's nullification power, one
that would also sweep away other well-accepted jury controls.
1. The impact of recognizing an Article III power to nullify.
Consider first the argument that Article III establishes in the
jury an affirmative power to nullify that may not be undercut by
efforts to purge nullifiers from the jury box. Recognition of that
power could change significantly the processing of federal jury
"Other possible limits include eliminating the unanimity requirement and allowing
judges to poll jurors or instruct them at an impasse.
"53Preemption of jury acquittals has been held to violate the Jury Clause. See United
States v Gaudin, 515 US 506, 510, 522-23 (1995) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
guarantees criminal defendants the right to a jury determination of guilt on each element
of the crime charged); United Brotherhood of Carpenters v United States, 330 US 395, 408
(1947) (noting that a judge may not direct a verdict of conviction no matter how conclusive
the evidence may be). Similarly, retrial after acquittal has been held to violate the Double
Jeopardy Clause. See Ball v United States, 163 US 662, 669-70 (1896) (holding that under
the Double Jeopardy Clause a jury acquittal could not be overturned, even though guilty
verdicts from the same trial were reversed).
"UThis analysis is at odds with Professor Westen's assessment of the Court's prece-
dent. See Westen, 78 Mich L Rev at 1012-18 (cited in note 1). I find, unlike Westen, that
finality and the difficulty of distinguishing legal error from reasonable doubt provide a
satisfactory explanation for most of the Court's choices. More fundamentally, I question
whether we should take as irrefutable declarations of constitutional meaning some of the
decisions in which the Court has allegedly honored the nullification right. In any event,
even if the Court eventually agrees that the Constitution protects jury nullification for its
own sake, one must keep looking for principles with which to further refine that right in




trials.'55 Under this theory, separation of powers cases rather
than defendants' rights cases would provide a more appropriate
analysis for distinguishing between permissible and impermissi-
ble infringement of the jury's nullification power. Separation of
powers doctrine, however, is notoriously inexact and its applica-
tion to this "fourth branch" completely uncharted. Consider the
application of just one test for undue infringement, an inquiry
into whether the action of one governmental institution "prevents
the [other branch] from accomplishing its constitutionally as-
signed functions."55 If one of the jury's assigned functions is to
check the judiciary, the legislature, or the executive by acquitting
"in the teeth of both law and facts,"'57 then only when that power
is impermissibly impaired would the Constitution be violated.
For example, one might conclude that keeping jurors in the
dark about nullification still permits them to tap their (albeit
uninformed) consciences, but keeping people off the jury who ad-
mit that they might tap their consciences completely disables
even uninformed nullification. If so, Article III could allow the ju-
dicial suppression of nullification instructions, evidence, and ar-
gument, but limit the government's ability to disqualify nullifica-
tion sympathizers. It is equally plausible, however, to argue that
instructing jurors that they "must" convict5 . disables the jury's
' Because the jury's power under Article m, if any, rests in the division of responsi-
bility among the institutions of the federal government, it would not limit the efforts of
state judges to eliminate jury nullification in state courts. Compare St. John, Note, 106
Yale L J at 2594 (cited in note 5) (discussing invalidity, under the Guarantee Clause of Ar-
ticle IV, of state legislation authorizing nullification). One tricky problem I do not address
here is whether a defendant, or even a juror, would have standing to protest any violation
of ajury's power under Article III. Compare Raines v Byrd, 117 S Ct 2312, 2322-23 (1997)
(denying standing to members of Congress alleging that the Line Item Veto Act improp-
erly alters the balance of powers between the legislative and executive branches).
'Nixon v Administrator of General Services, 433 US 425, 443 (1977) (opinion by
Brennan) (emphasis added). See also Morrison v Olson, 487 US 654, 691, 695 (1988)
(asking whether the restrictions are such that they "impede the [branch's] ability to per-
form [its] constitutional duty," or "'impermissibly undermine' the powers of the [branch]")
(internal citations omitted).
'"Homing v District of Columbia, 254 US 135, 138 (1920) (opinion by Holmes).
'See, for example, People v Goetz, 73 NY2d 751, 536 NYS2d 45, 46, 532 NE2d 1273,
1273 (1988) (upholding instruction that the jury "must" find the defendant guilty if the
government proves each element beyond a reasonable doubt). Although "must convict" in-
structions are common, many other courts use the phrase "should convict." See, for exam-
ple, United States v Sepulveda, 15 F3d 1161, 1190 (1st Cir 1993) (upholding conviction in
case in which judge answered jury request for clarification on jury nullification by in-
structing the jurors that they "should' convict" if government met its burden and "'must'
acquit if it did not, an instruction that "leaves pregnant the possibility that the jury could
ignore the law if it so chose"); State v Haas, 134 NH 480, 485, 596 A2d 127, 131 (1991)
(approving of judge's decision to repeat the original instructions that the jury "should find
the defendant guilty" if the government proves all of the elements of the crime, in re-
spose to the jury's question of whether their belief that defendant "was 'set up' by an ar-
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checking function as completely as excusing admitted nullifiers
during voir dire. One might even argue that separation of powers
principles bar no jury control short of complete preemption of the
jury's verdict of acquittal through the entry of a judgment of con-
viction: even retrials after acquittal or the application of collat-
eral estoppel against the defendant following one jury's determi-
nation do not prevent the jury as an institution from exercising
its checking powers, since both provide a jury with a chance to
nullify. 5 ' Indeterminacy aside, an Article III nullification power
is also inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision to allow
defendants the opportunity to waive trial by jury and be tried by
a judge instead, as Professor Amar has observed." ° If grounded in
Article III, nullification would be part of the structure of govern-
ment, not a personal right of the accused, hence waiver by the ac-
cused would be inappropriate.
2. Implications of recognizing nullification as an individual
right of defendant or juror.
A power to nullify based on the defendant's Sixth Amend-
ment protection would encounter similar difficulties. Sixth
Amendment theories that might regulate the exclusion of poten-
tial nullifiers from criminal juries have no logical boundaries. If
government is prohibited from crippling nullification through
jury selection, then shouldn't other efforts to cripple jury nullifi-
cation be off limits too? There is nothing in the text of the Sixth
Amendment, or in its past application, that might suggest where
a defendant's right to a jury that is free to nullify begins and
where it ends.'
The slippery slope of recognizing a constitutional limitation
on challenges for cause is even more apparent if one considers the
rogant police chief" is a basis for a reasonable doubt on the charged crime).
" It may be that the jury's right to nullify is something like the executive privilege-
constitutionally protected but with no readily discernable boundaries. But unlike
interesting questions about the scope of executive privilege, the potential for undue
infringement of the criminal jury's nullification power arises thousands of times every
year, whenever a defendant pleads not guilty to a felony and opts for a jury trial. Under
such circumstances, the clarity of boundaries is of greater importance.
'"Amar, 100 Yale L J at 1196-99 (cited in note 65). See also Broeder, 21 U Chi L Rev
at 417 n 149 (cited in note 100) (noting that conditioning jury waiver upon the govern-
ment's consent seems "wholly inconsistent with the theory that the jury trial operates as a
dispenser of mercy and as a protection against tyranny").
.61 Indeed, one defender of a "right to nullification" argues that courts need not fear
unjust acquittals since "the court may give the parties additional peremptory challenges
and liberally grant challenges for cause," procedures he assures "would serve the purpose
of keeping individuals off the jury who could not view the evidence fairly and imply .... "
Brody, 33 Am Crim L Rev at 118 (cited in note 5).
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juror's personal right to nullify. A juror's individual right to block
punishment authorized by law cannot be reconciled with retrials
after jury deadlocks," 2 nonunanimous verdicts in state criminal
trials," or peremptory challenges by the government of those
with qualms about the law."6 Indeed, a juror's right to nullify
may require prosecutors to come up with a "nullification neutral"
reason for exercising peremptory challenges.6 '
3. Tolerance, rather than protection, of jury nullification
provides predictable limits.
Unlike each of the foregoing theories, an explanation of jury
nullification that accords it no affirmative constitutional status
avoids the slippery slope. Explaining jury nullification as merely
the name we give to our inability or unwillingness to identify or
remedy lawless acquittals... neatly accounts for much of the ex-
isting precedent regarding judicial limits on nullification. So long
as judges are able to distinguish between fact-based reasons and
extra-legal reasons for acquitting, and so long as controlling nulli-
fication neither disturbs a jury verdict nor discourages or pre-
"dEven before the Founding, a hung jury did not carry the same consequences as a
verdict of acquittal; one juror's vote to acquit against the law only postponed punishment.
See George C. Thomas MI, Solving the Double Jeopardy Mistrial Riddle, 69 S Cal L Rev
1551, 1564-68 (1996) (tracing the history of mistrials due to a hung juries).
'"Apodaca v Oregon, 406 US 404, 413-14 (1972).
"'Justice Scalia defended this use of peremptories in Gray v Mississippi:
I assume that a State could not legislate that those who are more sympathetic toward
defendants than is the average person may not serve as jurors. But that surely does
not mean that prosecutors violate the Constitution by using peremptory challenges to
exclude such people. Since defendants presumably use their peremptory challenges in
the opposite fashion, the State's action simply does not result in juries "deliberately
tipped toward" conviction.
481 US 648, 679 (1987) (Scalia dissenting). See also Lockhart, 476 US at 173 ("[W]e have
never invoked the fair-cross-section principle to invalidate the use of. . . peremptory
challenges to prospective jurors."). Compare Krauss, 65 Wash U L Q at 543 (cited in note
15) (noting argument that peremptory challenges of those opposed to the death penalty
could implicate "the right of competent persons with qualms about the death penalty to
serve in capital cases").
'"Even trying to imagine what a "nullification neutral" reason might be brings into fo-
cus what may be the most difficult hurdle for any theory protective of nullification: the
problem of defining which of the reasons a juror may have for acquitting are protected and
which are not, a problem I address in the Part that follows.
'See, for example, United States v Perez, 86 F3d 735, 736 (7th Cir 1996) ("Jury nulli-
fication ... is not a right, either of the jury or of the defendant."); Leipold, 82 Va L Rev at
317-21 (cited in note 8) (arguing that nullification is not a constitutional right of either de-
fendant or jury); Simson, 54 Tex L Rev at 512-16 (cited in note 100) (discussing ill effects
of nullification); Warshawsky, Note, 85 Georgetown L J at 210 (cited in note 8) (terming
nullification "an unavoidable consequence of the various procedural safeguards imposed
on the system in order to protect values deemed more fundamental than the prevention of
jury nullification). See also text accompanying notes 58-62.
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empts candid jury room debate about the facts, judges willingly
have condemned any and all reasons for acquittal that fall out-
side what they perceive to be the letter of the law. For example,
venirepersons who admit that they disagree with some aspect of
the law during voir dire, or lawyers who insist on advancing ar-
guments unauthorized by the law, are easy targets. In both of
these contexts there is no risk of disturbing a verdict or disrupt-
ing deliberations, and questioning by the court provides a means
to reduce guesswork about the position of advocate or juror. Pre-
dictably, in these contexts, nullification advocacy is not tolerated.
After the verdict, when the costs of curing nullification rise, so
does judicial resistance to the cure. The interest of preserving the
finality of verdicts, the inability to know what really motivated a
jury's decision to agree on acquittal, and the fear that trying to
find out would systematically chill candid deliberations, all ac-
count for continued opposition to post-verdict regulation of crimi-
nal acquittals.
More specifically, an understanding of nullification as merely
the cost of protecting the double jeopardy interest in finality and
the Sixth Amendment interest in independent factfinding pro-
vides a sensible way to identify which of the potential jury con-
trols collected earlier may be tolerated and which may not. Such
an understanding would preclude, for example, a new trial after
acquittal and a judge's attempt to preempt a jury's acquittal by
entering judgment or partial judgment of conviction before, dur-
ing, or after a jury trial. These controls fail to protect the defen-
dant's constitutional interests in finality and independent fact-
finding. However, these interests would not be infringed by anti-
nullification instructions, limits on nullification argument and
evidence, or special interrogatories, which are presently prohib-
ited in many jurisdictions.67 The exclusion of nullifiers from the
jury can be analyzed according to whether that exclusion threat-
ens factfinding or finality. That analysis follows in Part II.E.
Thus, unlike the effort to confer independent constitutional
status on nullification, viewing nullification as a byproduct of the
protection of other constitutional rights provides a logical stop-
ping point along the spectrum of jury controls. Of course, nullifi-
cation advocates may not be troubled that recognition of a consti-
tutional limit on the government's ability to challenge nullifiers
for cause might logically lead to the abolition of other restraints
on the jury's power. But all of us should be wary of threats to es-
"See Wayne LaFave, Jerold Israel, and Nancy King, Criminal Procedure § 24.9
(forthcoming West 2d ed 1998).
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tablished procedural features of the criminal process. Other
revolutions in the constitutional regulation of jury selection, such
as the cross-section requirement and the Batson ban against
race-based peremptory challenges," have been preceded by an
outpouring of cultural, political, and jurisprudential concern
about race-based inequality. There is no similarly powerful socie-
tal impetus for calling into question nearly two centuries of
precedent permitting courts to exclude nullifiers from criminal
juries.
D. The Indeterminate Content of Nullification
Not only does a constitutional privilege protecting potential
nullifiers from exclusion lack a coherent pedigree and identifiable
bounds, it would also be a nightmare to administer. None of the
theories granting nullification independent protection contains
within it any clue about the content of such a privilege; for exam-
ple, which reasons to acquit would be privileged by the Constitu-
tion and which would not. So long as there is any constitutionally
protected sphere for nullification, judges will be plagued by the
task of distinguishing satisfactory extra-legal reasons to acquit
from unsatisfactory extra-legal reasons to acquit.
Consider the spectrum of reasons a juror might have for
voting to acquit a defendant whom she believes would be found
guilty if she followed the judge's instructions. She may acquit be-
cause she believes that the law the defendant violated is uncon-
stitutional; that the conduct it proscribes or the conduct of the de-
fendant does not deserve punishment; that the penalty she ex-
pects will be imposed on the defendant is too harsh; that the po-
lice or prosecutor acted in bad faith in preparing or presenting
the case; or that God would not provide punishment for the de-
fendant's acts.'89 The juror may decide to acquit because she be-
lieves that the victim, or the victim's friends or family (or racial
group), needs no protection; that the defendant, or the defen-
dant's friends or family (or racial group), has suffered enough;
that she will earn a personal benefit if she acquits; that the de-
fendant, or those who support his innocence, will harm her if she
"See Taylor v Louisiana, 419 US 522, 525 (1975) (explaining that "the Court has un-
ambiguously declared that the American concept of the jury trial contemplates a jury
drawn from a fair cross section of the community"); Batson v Kentucky, 476 US 79, 87-98
(1986).
"'For example, during jury selection for the Timothy McVeigh trial, one potential ju-
ror stated: "When there reaches a point where there's a difference between man's law and
God's law, then i'll be breaking the law." Steven V. Paulson, Jurors' Religious Beliefs Put
to the Test at Trial, Sunday Gaz Mail 7A (Apr 13, 1997).
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votes to convict; that voting to acquit is the fastest way to get out
of the jury room; that she cannot take the pressure put on her by
the other jurors who want to acquit; that the judge's instructions
regarding the sufficiency of proof were too easy on the prosecu-
tion; or that the instructions forbidding the jury to consider tes-
timony or evidence favorable to the defendant were wrong. If the
Constitution protects the jury's power to acquit against the law,
does it protect the jury's power to acquit for each of these rea-
sons?
All efforts to distinguish true nullification from bogus nullifi-
cation lack moorings in any of the theories that support constitu-
tional protection for nullification. Professors Amar and Paulsen
have suggested that the power of the jury to resist judge-
proclaimed law is limited to one narrow circumstance: when ju-
rors agree that a conviction would violate the Constitution.70
Thus the jury that believes the defendant's conduct was protected
by the Constitution would be entitled to acquit, but not the jury
merely sympathetic to the defendant. This constitutionality-only
theory of nullification also would seem to support a power (or
duty) to acquit based on what the jury perceives as the Constitu-
tion's procedural requirements. A jury might acquit because it
believes that the Constitution forbids it to consider crucial
damning evidence; because it believes that the Constitution man-
dates acquittal as a remedy for unconstitutional police acts; or
because it believes that the Constitution requires two eyewit-
nesses or fingerprints whenever identity is contested. Moreover,
it is not clear why a jury's power to acquit against the law under
Article III would be limited to deciding constitutional questions.'7 '
'"See Amar, 100 Yale L J at 1195 (cited in note 65) ("If ordinary Citizens were compe-
tent to make constitutional judgments when signing petitions or assembling in conven-
tions, why not injuries too? Is there not an important truth in Jefferson's exuberant 1789
definition of jury trials as 'trials by the people themselves."); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Captain James T. Kirk and the Enterprise of Constitutional Interpretation: Some Modest
Proposals from the Twenty-Third Century, 59 Albany L Rev 671, 688-90 (1995) (distin-
guishing between jury nullification, which he defines as the "deliberate disregard for the
law because one thinks it unjust," and a "case-specific power to refuse to accede to judicial
interpretations of the Constitution that a jury thinks are wrong, in any case where a jury
determination is necessary in order to carry out the state's exercise of authority against
persons").
..1 See, for example, Sparf, 156 US at 164 (Gray dissenting) ("It may well be doubted
whether such a distinction [between questions of constitutionality and other questions of
law] can be maintained."). This argument that jurors should decide the constitutionality of
the criminal law has appalled judges since at least 1800. See id at 70-71 (majority opinion)
("I have uniformly delivered the opinion that the petit jury have a right to decide the law
as well as the facts in criminal cases; but it never entered in my mind that they, therefore,
had a right to determine the constitutionality of any statute of the United States."), quot-
ing Justice Chase's statements in United States v Callender, 25 F Cas 239 (Cir Ct D Va
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The executive's discretion to pardon or decline to charge an indi-
vidual who is clearly guilty is not limited to instances where the
executive doubts the constitutionality of a law or a particular
prosecution.172 Similarly, there is nothing inherent in the Sixth
Amendment or jury rights theories that would allow courts to dif-
ferentiate between acceptable and unacceptable reasons for ac-
quittal.173
1800) (internal quotations and citations omitted); Sparf, 156 US at 73 ("Ifjuries once exer-
cise this power, we are without a Constitution or laws .... what you declare constitutional
to-day, another jury may declare unconstitutional to-morrow.") (citations omitted) (em-
phasis added). See also Pierce v State, 13 NH 536, 554-67 (1843) (collecting reasons why
the jury's power to decide the law cannot extend to deciding the constitutionality of stat-
utes).
'"Even the view that the jury's power is no greater than the judge's (the bicameral
theory) would allow juries much greater authority than commonly thought-juries could
reject convictions for law-related reasons as well as factual insufficiency, just as judges
may.
'"The Sixth Amendment theory of Professor Westen, for example, is skillfully derived
from precedent, but lacks an affirmative basis that might explain its scope. See generally
Westen, 78 Mich L Rev 1001 (cited in note 1). Proposals to distinguish acceptable from
unacceptable nullification seem impractical. See, for example, Lawrence R. Velvel, Unde-
clared War and Civil Disobedience: The American System in Crisis 227-29 (Cambridge
1970). Velvel proposed that a defendant be allowed to examine venirepersons about
"whether they could be open-minded or sympathetic to the idea of refusing to convict" if
the defendant's allegedly illegal act meets a set of criteria Velvel describes as justifying
civil disobedience. Id at 227. These criteria are: (1) the issue prompting protest is very im-
portant; (2) the defendant's views are well-founded; (3) efforts to achieve defendant's goals
through legal means have not succeeded within a reasonable time; (4) the act is nonviolent
or, if violent, is justified by truly extreme circumstances; (5) the act does not block the
mere expression of views; and (6) the defendant has given serious thought to all of these
considerations before committing to the act. Id at 205-14. "After questioning," Velvel
wrote, the defendant should be permitted to designate four or five members of the jury "so
long as they are merely open-minded or sympathetic rather than committed to an acquit-
tal." Id at 227. Velvel would limit this affirmative inclusion of nullification sympathizers,
however, to cases of civil disobedience, and not to cases involving other forms of criminal
conduct. Id at 228-29. Consider also Professor Paul Butler's protest that "[tihere is a prin-
cipled way to distinguish between good jury nullification and bad nullification." Paul But-
ler, Race-Based Jury Nullification: Surrebutal, 30 John Marshall L Rev 933, 934 (1996).
He explains that Fugitive Slave Act acquittals were "good jury nullification," and the trial
of Byron de La Beckwith was "bad nullification." Id at 934.
In a recent survey of college students, two researchers attempted to test whether or
not potential jurors accurately understood the nullification power. David C. Brody and
Craig Rivera, Examining the Dougherty 'All-Knowing Assumption': Do Jurors Know
About Their Nullification Power?, 33 Crim L Bull 151, 161-65 (1997). To do this, they dis-
tilled the correct conception of nullification to four statements concerning the reasons a ju-
ror may acquit and four predictions of juror exposure to sanctions when a jury acquits
"even though the juror believes the evidence has proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."
Included within the authors' definition of an accurate understanding of nullification was
the option to "[djisregard the written law and overwhelming evidence of guilt and find the
defendant not guilty, because the police wrongfully assaulted the defendant after he was
arrested." The authors concluded on the basis of their study that only 6 percent of the
subjects "had an accurate understanding of the jury's nullification power." Id. Needless to
say, given the variety of "understandings" of the jury's nullification power collected in this
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In addition to lacking content, a constitutional rule against
the exclusion of nullifiers would carry significant costs for the
jury system, which is already burdened by layer upon layer of
time-consuming procedural requirements. Given the need to de-
termine whether a challenge for cause is based on sufficiently
protected beliefs, prosecutors would be entitled to insist upon
questions that would disclose the exact nature of each juror's atti-
tudes toward each statute under which the defendant was
charged, and toward any legal standards that the judge will ask
the jury to apply. Defendants, too, would require leeway to reha-
bilitate any juror who suggests that she has the right to deter-
mine or disagree with the law. At a time when courts and legisla-
tures are revamping their jury procedures to provide more effec-
tive utilization of the time of jurors and other participants,"" a
rule that would require carefully regulated "conviction-
qualification" of every criminal juror would be unreasonably
cumbersome.
E. Three Modest Proposals-Regulating the Exclusion and
Punishment of Jurors Under the Due Process Clause and the
Sixth Amendment
An accused should not be permitted to call on a right to nulli-
fication in the Constitution in order to bar the exclusion or pun-
ishment of a juror unwilling to follow the law and convict. How-
ever, the accused is not without a constitutionally based remedy
for abusive practices. Exclusions for cause, mid-trial dismissals,
and post-trial penalties each require scrutiny for different rea-
sons. First, otherwise neutral standards for exclusion for cause
may be applied unfairly, favoring one party over another. Second,
mid-trial investigations of alleged nullifiers may become so intru-
sive that they deprive a defendant of the Sixth Amendment right
to a jury's independent view of the facts. Finally, post-trial penal-
ties for jurors' behavior during trial may involve judicial or prose-
cutorial vindictiveness that violates due process.
1. No favoritism.
As we have seen, American courts purport to apply a neutral
test for screening juror bias that allows either party to challenge
for cause any juror who appears unable to convict or to acquit.
Ironically enough, given the allegations of his own bias in the
Article, that finding is not surprising.
"'See, for example, G. Thomas Munsterman, Paula L. Hannaford, and G. Marc
Whitehead, eds, Jury Trial Innovations (Natl Center for State Cts 1997).
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case, this definition of impartiality was first articulated by Jus-
tice John Marshall in the trial of Aaron Burr.75 As the trial judge
presiding over the case, Justice Marshall explained that his task
was to identify lightly held and fixed views on both sides. There-
fore, jurors who had been convinced of the defendant's innocence
and had campaigned on the part of the defendant would not be
able to serve, just as those convinced of his guilt were disquali-
fied. 76
Nearly two centuries later, the Supreme Court, in its con-
temporary efforts to regulate death-qualification, continues to
pursue this declared distinction, authorizing the disqualification
of only those jurors who are unable to exercise the discretion re-
quired by law. The Court may not have recognized a constitu-
tional power to nullify in the Witherspoon line of cases, but it did
recognize that due process may be violated by a particularly one-
sided application of the challenge for cause. The Court was will-
ing to ensure that no one would be executed as a result of skewed
application of the challenge, skewed in the sense that a judge ex-
cludes venirepersons who have qualms (but not overriding ones)
175 United States v Burr, 25 F Cas 49, 51-52 (Cir Ct D Va 1807). For examples of courts
applying the cause standard narrowly during the nineteenth century, see, for example,
United States v Eagan, 30 F 608, 609 (8th Cir 1887) (refusing to allow exclusion of grand
juror on the basis of political affiliation); Atkins v State, 16 Ark 568, 580 (1855) (holding
that it was error for the trial court to reject jurors who expressed opposition to the death
penalty "unless they had gone further and brought themselves within the disqualification
prescribed by the statute"); People v Stewart, 7 Cal 141, 143-44 (1857) (holding that it was
error, under statute excluding from a capital case any juror with "conscientious opinions
as would preclude him from finding the prisoner guilty," for trial judge to exclude juror
who said he was "opposed to capital punishment on principle," because "principle founded
on political prejudices, or public policy" has "no connection whatever" with "conscience").
"76Justice Marshall justified his decision to disqualify jurors favorable to the prosecu-
tion in Burr's trial as follows:
If, instead of a panel composed of gentlemen who had almost unanimously formed
and publicly delivered an opinion that the prisoner was guilty, the marshal had re-
turned one composed of persons who had openly and publicly maintained his inno-
cence; who had insisted that, notwithstanding all the testimony in possession of the
public, they had no doubt that his designs were perfectly innocent; who had been en-
gaged in repeated, open and animated altercations to prove him innocent, and that
his objects were entirely opposite to those with which he was charged-would such
men be proper and impartial jurors? I cannot believe they would be thought so. I am
confident I should not think them so. I cannot declare a juror to be impartial who has
advanced opinions against the prisoner which would be cause of challenge if ad-
vanced in his favor.
Burr, 25 F Cas at 52. In context, Marshall's stated intention to disqualify defense sympa-
thizers was hard to believe. Whether there were such people in the apparently conviction-
prone venire is not likely. None of the jurors who admitted to bias admitted to bias in fa-
vor of the defendant.
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about death but retains venirepersons who have qualms (but not
overriding ones) about life.'"
It is a small step from this to the recognition that a judge can
violate a defendant's right to due process by failing to administer
the same standard of impartiality for the defense as for the
prosecution. Grossly asymmetric rulings on juror bias or miscon-
duct resemble other attempts to manipulate the process unfairly
in favor of the government, attempts that have been condemned
by the Court as a denial of due process, such as paying judges for
convictions but not for acquittals, 7 ' or demanding discovery while
granting none." 9 A defendant should receive a new trial if the
court applies a palpably lower standard for disqualifying venire-
members challenged by the prosecution than it applies to veni-
remembers challenged by the defense. For instance, if a judge
took the word of every venireperson who admitted she had heard
about a defendant's inadmissible confession of guilt but could put
it aside, but refused to credit reasonable assurances by venire-
persons who had admitted they had read FIJA literature but
could put it aside, the defendant may have been denied due proc-
ess. Courts also must avoid content analysis of juror sentiment
when confronted mid-trial with jurors who resist following in-
structions. As the Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently ex-
plained, "[t]he rule authorizing dismissal of a juror who disre-
gards the law does not include an exception for jurors who violate
their sworn duty" for particular reasons.' s
2. No coercion.
Judicial efforts to purge juries of nullification advocates may
exceed constitutional bounds for another reason. Even though no
constitutionally based right or power protects jurors who plan to
nullify, at some point a judge's actions toward a deliberating jury
" Morgan v illinois, 504 US 719, 728-29 (1992) (holding that trial court violated de-
fendant's due process rights in disqualifying potential jurors who responded in the af-
firmative when asked whether they would vote automatically against the death penalty
regardless of the facts of the case, but refusing to ask whether they would vote automati-
cally for the death penalty); Gillers, 129 U Pa L Rev at 75 n 351 (cited in note 85) (arguing
that Witherspoon is based on the Due Process Clause, not the Sixth Amendment). The
Court recognized as early as 1947 that, "[u]ndoubtedly a system of exclusions could be so
manipulated as to call a jury before which defendants would have so little chance of a de-
cision on the evidence that it would constitute a denial of due process." Fay v New York,
332 US 261, 288 (1947).
'"See Tumey v Ohio, 273 US 510, 535 (1927) (reversing defendant's conviction on the
grounds that a judge whose pay is based on number of convictions is not impartial).
'"See Wardius v Oregon, 412 US 470, 476 (1973).
"Thomas, 116 F3d at 617 (noting no exception for jurors who disobey instructions "on
the basis of racial or ethnic interests or affinities").
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may violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to factfind-
ing by a jury acting independently of the judge's coercive influ-
ence. Intrusion into deliberations by a judge bent on discouraging
nullification could be so extensive or one-sided that one or more
jurors may be indirectly coerced into abandoning genuine doubts
about the sufficiency of the government's proof. In addition, at
least in federal trials, defendants have the right to a unanimous
verdict of guilt, which would be violated by the selective exclusion
of only those jurors who are not persuaded of the defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. These risks are most likely to
arise in the context of mid-trial investigations into allegations of
misconduct by a juror who has expressed views against convic-
tion.'8'
There are several possible responses to the risk that judicial
efforts to ferret out nullifiers will, in addition, coerce factfinding.
The Sixth Amendment may only require that any convicted de-
fendant have the opportunity to prove either that the judge, with
the intent to obtain a conviction and avoid a hung jury, removed
a juror who possessed a reasonable doubt about guilt,'82 or that
the judge interrogated jurors in such a way that a juror actually
felt coerced into abandoning reasonable doubts about guilt. In
United States v Thomas," the Second Circuit went further, re-
quiring that before removing a juror for failure to adhere to the
.'For examples of cases in which a judge's decision to dismiss a juror during trial was
overturned due to these concerns, see United States v Hernandez, 862 F2d 17, 22 (2d Cir
1988) (holding that the removal of the sole holdout juror was error); State v Valenzuela,
136 NJ 458, 643 A2d 582, 583-86 (1994) (finding error in trial judge's dismissal of juror
during deliberation); Cook v State, 100 Md App 616, 642 A2d 290, 295-96 (Md Ct Spec App
1994) (finding error in trial judge's dismissal following the close of evidence of a juror who
had sent a note to the judge during the trial expressing views that favored the defendant).
'Consider, as an example, a case decided in Kansas in which a jury convicted a police
officer of murdering, in the course of a fight, a person who had earlier filed a complaint
about his conduct as an officer with the Internal Affairs Office of the Kansas City Police.
See State v Cheek, 262 Kan 91, 936 P2d 749, 751-55 (1997). Accounts of the trial in the
press reported that the officer was white and his victim African-American, and noted that
"M[race was an issue in the case." John T. Dauner, High Court Examines Cheek Case, Kan
City Star C1 (Jan 24, 1997). After only an hour and a half of deliberations, one of the
white jurors asked to be released from the jury, explaining that he could not agree with
the majority, which favored conviction. The trial judge, who the press took care to point
out was African-American, granted his request after a brief in-chambers inquiry. Another
white male juror was substituted. The resulting conviction was overturned by the Kansas
Supreme Court in an opinion that carefully distinguished numerous other juror dismissal
cases and reasoned that no reasonable cause existed to support the dismissal. See Cheek,
936 P2d at 756-61; John T. Dauner, Ex-KCK officer released on bond, Kan City Star C1
(May 28, 1997); John T. Dauner, Court orders murder retrial, Kan City Star Al (Apr 19,
1997); Dauner, High Court, Kan City Star at C1. See also Hernandez, 862 F2d at 23
(holding that it was error to remove juror to avoid hung jury).
1- 116 F3d 606, 621-22 (2d Cir 1997).
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instructions, a trial court must assure itself that the juror was
engaged in deliberate misconduct, and that there is no possibility
that the juror had reasonable doubts about the defendant's
guilt."M Even stronger limits are possible. Judges could be barred
from dismissing jurors whose misconduct consists only of unlaw-
ful arguments or reasoning during deliberations, at least where
the juror's intent to disregard the judge's instructions can be
proved only by another juror's testimony about what was ex-
pressed during deliberations.'85
Even if the prophylactic protection against coerced convic-
tions offered by these formulas is not constitutionally necessary,
it makes good sense. In particular, support for a rule barring the
removal of jurors for their arguments in the jury room can be de-
rived from cases limiting the post-trial punishment of jurors for
their conduct as jurors. Although judges have not hesitated to ex-
clude nullifiers during voir dire over the years, they have in the
past refused to punish jurors after a trial has ended for nullifica-
tion advocacy during deliberations. For example, in a New York
case from 1924,186 the court explained that a juror may not be
held in contempt for "stating facts to be in evidence as to which
no testimony had been given," proposing "to the jurors that they
should acquit [the defendant] if one Smith, a stranger to the pro-
ceeding, would give a bond for [the defendant's] future good be-
havior," and failing "to keep his promise to render a decision on
the evidence, to be a fair and impartial juror, and to obey the in-
structions of the court because believing the defendant to be
guilty, he still refused to vote for his conviction.""7 A juror may
not be punished for contempt, the court concluded, "for his part in
any proceedings connected with the rendition of the verdict, be-
cause of discussions had, arguments used, statements made, for
the reasons given by him for his vote or for the vote itself."'" Pol-
'The court explained that a lower standard would lead to the removal ofjurors on the
basis of their views of the evidence, thus denying defendants right to a unanimous ver-
dict. Id. Later the court explained that "to provide opportunities for far-ranging judicial
inquisition into the thought processes ofjurors would, in our view, destroy the jury system
itself." Id at 623.
" Compare id at 613-14 (distinguishing examples of cases in which juror bias was es-
tablished by proof of a pretrial event or relationship outside the courthouse affecting the
juror).
"In re Cochran, 237 NY 336, 336, 143 NE 212, 212 (1924).
' Id. See also Bays v Petan Co, 94 FRD 587, 591 (D Nev 1982) (holding that a juror's
improper arguments in the course of deliberations did not constitute contempt in the ab-
sence of false swearing or willful concealment during voir dire).
"In re Cochran, 143 NE at 213 (emphasis added). The court relied on a statute that
dated from 1801 prohibiting courts from subjecting any juror to "any action or proceeding,
civil or criminal, except to indictment for corrupt conduct in rendering such verdict." Id.
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icy, the court stated, requires jurors be "given the utmost freedom
of debate... .189
On the other hand, courts have readily penalized jurors for
conduct other than lawless expressions in the jury room, so long
as that misconduct can be demonstrated by evidence independent
of jury room deliberations. 9 ° Most familiar are convictions of ju-
rors for lying or nondisclosure during voir dire.'9 ' The Supreme
Court considered such a case in Clark v United States in 1933.92
Genevieve Clark was convicted of contempt for giving false an-
swers during voir dire in the trial of several businessmen who
had employed her years earlier, and with whom her husband had
been friendly. During voir dire she never revealed her connec-
tions to the defendants. Although she was not asked directly if
she knew the defendants, she was questioned about her previous
work experience. She did not reveal her previous employment
relationship with the defendants. She was also asked whether
she felt that her mind was free from bias, and whether if accepted
as a juror she would be able and willing to base her verdict on the
evidence and the law as given to her by the court. She said she
was free of bias and willing to base her decision on the evidence
and the law.'93
According to later testimony of the other jurors, however,
during deliberations Clark volunteered information about one of
the defendants that was not in evidence,'94 expressed "dissatisfac-
tion with the Government because of the way the soldiers were
treated after the war,"'95 stated that one of the government wit-
nesses had perjured himself before in another case, and refused
to convict. 9 ' "At times she placed her hands over her ears when
other jurors tried to reason with her."'97 The jury hung, and the
government went after Clark with contempt charges based on her
dishonesty during voir dire. In upholding her conviction, the Su-
'"Id.
'See People v Rosenthal, 370 M 244, 245-47, 18 NE2d 450, 451-52 (1938) (Jurors
brought liquor to their rooms, visited taverns where they drank, danced with customers,
played slot machines, and "were disorderly."); In re Cochran, 143 NE at 213 (noting in
dicta that contempt would be available for misconduct such as smuggling intoxicating liq-
uor or a reporter into the jury room).
"'See, for example, In re Nunns, 38 NY Crim Rep 7, 188 AD 424, 176 NYS 858, 868-69
(NY App Div 1919) (holding that juror testimony may be received to show that another ju-
ror lied during voir dire).





" Id at 8-9.
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preme Court acknowledged the concern that "[freedom of debate
might be stifled and independence of thought checked if jurors
were made to feel that their arguments and ballots were to be
freely published to the world."'98 But, it reasoned, "[aissuming
there is a privilege which protects from impertinent exposure the
arguments and ballots of a juror while considering his verdict, we
think the privilege does not apply where the relation giving birth
to it has been fraudulently begun or fraudulently continued."'99
Discounting the risk that such intrusion will chill candor in the
jury room, Justice Cardozo continued:
A juror of integrity and reasonable firmness will not fear to
speak his mind if the confidences of debate are barred to the
ears of mere impertinence or malice. He will not expect to be
shielded against the disclosure of his conduct in the event
that there is evidence reflecting upon his honor. The chance
that now and then there may be found some timid soul who
will take counsel of his fears and give way to their repressive
power is too remote and shadowy to shape the courts of jus-
tice. It must yield to the overmastering need, so vital in our
polity, of preserving trial by jury in its purity against the in-
roads of corruption.00
This sweeping language suggested no limit on a court's ability to
root out the slightest disobedience on the part of jurors. The Su-
preme Court, however, included a caveat in its ruling, a caveat
that suggests that nullification arguments in the jury room,
without more, do not warrant sanction. It warned that "a mere
charge of wrongdoing" would not "avail without more to put the
privilege to flight. There must be a showing of a prima facie case
sufficient to satisfy the judge that the light should be let in. 2'
Significantly, the Court also suggested that the prima facie case
of juror wrongdoing must be established with evidence other than
the allegations of other jurors. "Upon that showing ... the de-
bates and ballots in the jury room are admissible as corroborative
evidence, supplementing and confirming the case that would exist
without them."' The Court took care to distinguish Bushell's
Case,"°' stating that Clark "has not been held to answer for any




2" Id at 14.
'Id (emphasis added).
'Vaughan 135, 124 Eng Rep 1006, 1012-16 (CP 1670).
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considering her verdict .... What was said and done in the jury
room is not the gist of her wrongdoing... [but] is no more than
confirmatory evidence of her state of mind before." °4
This cautious approach to intruding upon deliberations is
appropriate while a jury is deliberating actively, as well as after
the trial has ended. Indeed, the risk that mid-trial investigations
will affect the deliberations of the jury being investigated is cer-
tainly less "remote and shadowy" than the risk that post-trial in-
quiries will influence the deliberations of future juries. If jurors
know that the judge will scrutinize their deliberations, remove
them from the jury, and even sanction them for misstatements,
they may avoid discussing matters that they mistakenly believe
are off limits. 5 Removal also offers an escape hatch for those ju-
rors who may not be inclined to stand by their views of innocence,
an easy exit from what can be a demanding duty. Finally, be-
cause intent is particularly hard to prove as well as disprove, the
prospect of removal or sanctions for opinions expressed in the
jury room exposes any juror with unpopular views of the evidence
to the risk of being framed or misunderstood. Frustrated jurors
could manufacture misconduct by holdouts in order to end a
stalemate."° For these reasons, not because of any affirmative
Clark, 289 US at 17-18 (emphasis added). In Clark, the prima facie evidence con-
sisted of Clark's former employment with the defendants, which she concealed during voir
dire, and her arguments with jurors prior to deliberations. The fact that Clark voted for
acquittal was volunteered by Clark herself. Id at 9. Subsequent convictions of holdouts for
deceit during voir dire also have included proof independent of exchanges during delibera-
tions. See, for example, In re Brogdon, 625 F Supp 422, 425 (W D Ark 1985); United States
v Lampkin, 66 F Supp 821, 824 (S D Fla 1946) (addressing giving false information during
voir dire). See also United States v Morris, 26 F Cas 1323, 1325-29 (Cir Ct D Mass 1851);
King, 94 Mich L Rev at 2725-26 nn 207-09 (cited in note 29) (collecting cases). Other mis-
conduct charges against holdouts include coercion toward other jurors going beyond per-
suasive argument, see Thomas, 116 F3d at 624 ("[We do not suggest, much less hold, that
a juror's disruptive behavior-his reported 'hollering,' threatening to strike a fellow juror,
or feigned vomiting--could not serve as grounds for dismissal"); King, 94 Mich L Rev at
2734 (cited in note 29) (reporting coercive acts of jurors towards each other), and the de-
liberate introduction of tangible material into the jury room other than that admitted as
evidence. See, for example, United States v Brodie, 858 F2d 492, 494 (9th Cir 1988), over-
ruled on other grounds by United States v Morales, 108 F3d 1031 (9th Cir 1997), in which
tax protestors challenged conviction based on the "alleged intrusion of prejudicial matter
into the jury room," specifically, a booklet containing quotations from the Bible, the
United States Constitution, and the Magna Carts. The court rejected the challenge on
grounds that the book could not have possibly affected the verdict. Brodie, 858 F2d at 495.
'Admittedly, this prediction, like Cardozo's, is speculation without empirical support.
'See, for example, Charles E. Brown, Jury Finds No Conspiracy; 4 Guilty on Other
Counts-3 Defendants Not Convicted of Any Charges, Seattle Times A5 (Mar 1, 1997) (de-
scribing criminal trial of militia members and supporters in which jury members issued
dueling notes accusing each other of misconduct and requesting discipline and replace-
ment); Joshua G. Grunat, Note, Post-Submission Substitution of Alternate Jurors in Fed-
eral Criminal Cases: Effects of Violations of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 23(b) and
1998] 489
The University of Chicago Law Review
constitutional protection for nullification, a trial judge should re-
frain from removing jurors from juries when the only evidence of
misconduct consists of the arguments or statements of jurors
during their deliberations. 7
3. No vindictiveness.
A special type of danger arises when jurors are prosecuted
and sanctioned for their misconduct as jurors. Whenever holdouts
for the defense are targeted for misconduct sanctions, those pen-
alties will appear to some as retaliatory measures taken against
jurors who dared to question the state's case rather than as le-
gitimate measures to control juror misconduct.0 s Fines and jail
terms for holdout jurors (even for relatively easily proved miscon-
duct such as deceit during voir dire) may suggest to future jurors
that if they vote to acquit they risk facing the same persecution.
Over sixty years ago, in Clark, the Supreme Court dismissed
such fears as unfounded, at least where the juror's misconduct
was established by proof of deceit independent of the content of
24(c), 55 Fordham L Rev 861, 881 n 144 (1987) (collecting cases expressing concern that
members of the jury may influence a lone juror to feign illness in order to place the burden
of decision on an alternate). Similar concerns about chilling deliberations and abuse by
losing litigants underlie rules against the admission of juror testimony to impeach ver-
dicts after trials are complete. See FRE 606. In addition, checking up on jurors' adherence
to instructions would be time consuming. Think of the dialogue that often takes place
during voir dire in order to "pin down" a juror's views about the death penalty. Imagine
duplicating that kind of dialogue throughout deliberations in response to each juror's
complaint that another juror did not understand or would not follow the judge's instruc-
tions.
'I do not suggest that ajudge should be unable to remove any deliberating juror once
the judge learns the juror has expressed the intent to vote for acquittal. Independently
disqualifying reasons, such as illness or other misconduct, would still justify dismissal, so
long as there is adequate proof of the disqualifying action or condition. But certainly spe-
cial care must be taken when a judge knows that the wayward or suffering juror is a hold-
out for the defense so as not to "send a message" through dismissal to the remaining ju-
rors that the court "endorsed their proclivity for conviction and implicitly encouraged
them to 'hold their position.'" Perez v Marshall, 119 F3d 1422, 1429-30 (9th Cir 1997)
(Nelson dissenting) (arguing that judge's decision to dismiss holdout violated Sixth
Amendment, disagreeing with the trial court's assessment of juror as emotionally dis-
traught, noting "hers was an emotional reaction to what is universally recognized as a
stressful experience," and arguing that she never refused to deliberate). See also United
States v Barone, 114 F3d 1284, 1309 (1st Cir 1997) (upholding decision to excuse juror "for
a valid reason that was entirely unrelated to the issue of how he felt about the sufficiency
of the government's proof"); United States v Leahy, 82 F3d 624, 629 (5th Cir 1996) (uphold-
ing removal of hard-of-hearing holdout).
'Laura Kriho's protest, 'Li]f I had voted guilty, I never would have been prosecuted,"
sounds quite convincing. Laura Kriho, When Courts Violate the Founders' Intent, Wash
Post A18 (May 28, 1997). See also King, 94 Mich L Rev at 2725-26 (cited in note 29) (col-
lecting cases suggesting prosecutors may be more willing to pursue sanctions against ju-
rors who vote for acquittal than they are against jurors who vote to convict, and noting the
risk of vindictiveness).
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deliberations." 9 Since its decision in Clark, however, the Court
has adopted safeguards against even the appearance of vindic-
tiveness in analogous contexts. In order to avoid chilling the exer-
cise of the right to appeal, due process may now require a judge
who sentences a defendant to a longer term after a successful ap-
peal to articulate a nonvindictive reason for increasing the pen-
alty.21° Prosecutors may have to articulate appropriate reasons for
some charging decisions, in order to dispel the appearance of vin-
dictiveness. 1' Similarly, whenever jurors from nonconvicting ju-
ries are prosecuted for misconduct, some demonstration of non-
vindictiveness might be required in order to avoid deterring fu-
ture jurors from holding out for acquittal when they have reason-
able doubts about guilt."2 At the least, a showing should be re-
quired that the government investigated the truthfulness or con-
duct of jurors known to have voted for conviction, or a showing
that jurors in cases where the defendant was convicted also are
investigated and prosecuted for similar activity."3
2"289 US at 14.
"'See North Carolina v Pearce, 395 US 711, 726 (1969).
2" See Blacklege v Perry, 417 US 21, 26-27 (1974) (discussing instances where courts
review for vindictiveness the conduct not only of the prosecutor, but also of the judge and
jury).
2"Using the Court's own criteria for assessing when a nonvindictive reason is required
in charging cases, the probability of a vindictive motive for sanctioning a holdout juror is
quite high. A holdout who causes a mistrial forces the state to try the case over all again,
the kind of consequence that the Court found sufficiently aggravating for the government
in Blackledge. 417 US at 27. The probability that a judge and prosecutor would want to
punish an acquittal-minded juror is, at the least, higher than in cases such as Goodwin, in
which the Court found that prosecutors may have had plenty of reasons to raise charges
other than to deter defendants from exercising their rights. United States v Goodwin, 457
US 368,381-82 (1982).
"'Agan, to be clear, my rationale for demanding some protection against the vindic-
tive prosecution of jurors who vote to acquit is not based on the need to protect the rights
of the individual juror. In other words, a juror objecting to such a prosecution would not
be protesting that she is being punished for asserting her own constitutional right, see
Wayte v United States, 470 US 598, 607-09 (1985) (discussing the constitutional limits of
selective prosecution); Goodwin, 457 US at 372-73 (same), but instead she would be
claiming that her prosecution is inconsistent with another's rights (that of a future defen-
dant). Just as one defendant is prohibited from raising violations of another person's
rights under the Fourth Amendment, jurors may have a difficult time raising the rights of
putative defendants. Such standing problems may, I admit, preclude the defense entirely.
While another basis for the defense might be that prosecution chills the juror's civil right
to serve on the jury, this rationale would not seem to warrant special protection for the
acquittal-prone juror.
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II. NULLIFICATION ADVOCACY OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM: FIJA
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT
A. Restraining Nullification Advocacy
A similar neutral approach should resolve the growing ten-
sion between nullification protestors or leafleters and the judges
whose power these advocates hope to undermine. The Supreme
Court has declared that "[fireedom of discussion should be given
the widest range compatible with the essential requirement of
the fair and orderly administration of justice."214 But FIJA sup-
porters have learned that the price of efforts to educate potential
jurors about nullification may be prosecution. In the past two
years, jury nullification supporters have been charged with ob-
structing justice215 or with contempt after passing out literature
advocating jury nullification at state and federal courthouses in
several cities, including Billings, Montana; Los Angeles; Las Ve-
gas; Milwaukee; and Wichita, Kansas.2 1 6
"'Pennekamp v Florida, 328 US 331, 347 (1946) (reversing a contempt conviction for
newspaper editorials because the comments, although critical, did not influence pending
litigation).
"'See 18 USC § 1503(a) (1994) (providing that a person may be imprisoned for up to
ten years if he "corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communi-
cation, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any grand or petit juror... in the
discharge of his duty").
Another statute directed particularly at protest activity outside courthouses, 18
USC § 1507 (1994), was enacted in response to the picketing of federal courthouses by
partisans of leaders of the Communist Party prosecuted during the late 1940s. It provides
that:
Whoever, with the intent of interfering with, obstructing, or impeding the admini-
stration of justice, or with the intent of influencing any .. juror... in the discharge
of his duty, pickets or parades in or near a building housing a court of the United
States, or in or near a building or residence occupied or used by such.., juror ... or
with such intent... resorts to any other demonstration in or near any such building
or residence, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both.
...See Montana v Holland, No CR-95-53, slip op at 1, 30 (Mont 21st Dist, Nov 29,
1995) (order denying defendant's motion to dismiss) (refusing to dismiss state charges of
improperly influencing a jury against Joe Holland, who allegedly mailed letters to pro-
spective members of the jury panel scheduled to hear his case); Juror Guilty of Tampering,
The Spotlight (July 21, 1997), reprinted at 9:1 FJActivist 33 (Summer 1997) (reporting
conviction for the distribution of nullification handbills in Los Angeles federal court); Doig,
8:2 FIJActivist at 4 (cited in note 7) (reporting an arrest and prosecution for leafleting in
Los Angeles); LV man jailed for pamphlets, Las Vegas Rev J (June 7, 1996), reprinted at
8:1 FIJActivist 19 (Summer 1996) (reporting that a man facing trial was arrested after re-
peatedly disobeying warnings not to hand out FIJA literature to prospective jurors near
the Clark County Courthouse); Letter from Stewart L. Bell, District Attorney, Clark
County, Nevada, to Chuck Short, District Court Administrator (July 15, 1996) (on file with
U Chi L Rev) (explaining decision of Las Vegas authorities not to press tampering
charges); Reynolds Holding, Group Tries to Sway Jurors, San Francisco Chron B1, B3
(Dec 11, 1995) (noting that a woman was charged with the federal offenses of jury tam-
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In Fairbanks, Alaska, Frank Turney is being prosecuted for
his successful attempts in 1994 to persuade jurors not to convict
Merle Hall, who was charged with being a felon in possession of a
concealed firearm after he used a shotgun to blast his own televi-
sion and fish bowl." Before and during Hall's trial, Turney ap-
proached persons wearing juror badges inside and outside the
courthouse, and urged them to call the phone number 1-800-TEL-
JURY to listen to a recording that informed each caller, as one ju-
ror summarized, "that I have more rights than what was read to
meby the judge."218 At least two of the jurors called the number
and changed their votes to "not guilty," causing a mistrial.219 De-
spite protests by the Alaska Civil Liberties Union as amicus, the
Alaska Supreme Court refused to dismiss the resulting tamper-
ing and trespass charges that were filed against Turney.'
Some jurisdictions have adopted ordinances or court orders
directed at nullification advocates. In Lubbock, Texas, for exam-
ple, the Lubbock County Commissioners reportedly prohibited
the distribution of all information, literature, and propaganda in
the Lubbock County courthouse after FIJA supporters leafleted
the courthouse, but then quickly repealed the controversial or-
der."' A similar order and rescission took place in Milwaukee. 2
pering and obstruction of justice for placing FIJA leaflets on cars around the courthouse
where her son and ex-husband were facing drug charges, but explaining that the woman's
charges would be dropped as long as she managed to stay out of trouble for eighteen
months); Fred W. Lindecke, Point of Law: Juries Entitled to Ignore It; The Power of Nulli-
fication Puts Activists, Jurists at Odds, St. Louis Post-Dispatch B5 (Oct 25, 1995) (report-
ing that in 1991, a FIJA activist was arrested for distributing FIJA literature at a Mil-
waukee courthouse and then released); Don Doig, State News: News and Commentary
from the Frontlines, 20 FIJActivist 5 (Autumn 1995) (describing verdict in case against
man charged with "obstructing public business" for distributing FIJA materials inside
Wichita City Hall); William P. Cheshire, Nevada Florist Charged with "Felonious" Hand-
bill Distribution, Ariz Republic B4 (Aug 17, 1995) (reporting that a woman who was
charged with multiple counts of jury tampering in Butte County, California sued the
prosecutor after the charges were dropped). Charges have apparently been considered but
rejected by prosecutors in other cities where leafleters have been active. See, for example,
Sharon Mack, Judge Hears Slate of Motions in Don Christen 'Brownies Case", Bangor
Daily News (Feb 6, 1996) (reporting that prosecutor explained to judge that his office had
considered charging the defendant with jury tampering for handing out leaflets but had
decided against it).
2Turney v State, 936 P2d 533, 536-58 (Alaska 1997).
21fId at 537 n 4. Turney reportedly even went fishing with a juror, and paraded around
the courthouse, making "sheep-bleating sounds through a bullhorn." Dodge, 9:1 FIJActiv-
ist at 4 (cited in note 7).
''Turney, 936 P2d at 537 (iT]wo jurors had changed their votes to 'not guilty' after
speaking with Turney or calling the number.").
Id at 538-42.
" Doig, 8:2 FIJActivist at 5 (cited in note 7).
'See Lindecke, St Louis Post-Dispatch at B5 (cited in note 216); Doig, 8:2 FLJActivist
at 4 (cited in note 7).
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In San Diego, a court order now bars anyone within fifty yards of
any courthouse from communicating with any person summoned
as a trial juror for the purposes of influencing or impeding "the
lawful discharge of the duties of a trial juror."' The Supreme
Court recently declined to hear a First Amendment challenge to
this ordinance pressed by FIJA, and has yet to consider the First
Amendment implications of the prosecution of nullification advo-
cates under any law."
B. Constitutional Protection for Nullification Related Speech?
In evaluating the constitutionality of restraints on out-of-
court nullification advocacy, the exact source of the nullification
power loses importance. Under a defendant's rights theory of
nullification, for example, the jury represents neither the gov-
ernment nor the defendant but is independent of both, and both
parties have an interest in this independence. Some speech di-
rected at jurors may undercut the jury's ability to impartially de-
cide a dispute between the government and one of its citizens.2"
'Fully Informed Jury Association v San Diego, 1996 US App LEIS 4254, *2-3 (9th
Cir) (unpublished opinion) (quoting the local ordinance), cert denied, 117 S Ct 63 (1996).
'Fully Informed Jury Association v County of San Diego, 117 S Ct 63 (1996) (denying
certiorari). A FIJA activist, Jim Harnsberger, reportedly was convicted of contempt for
violating the order in state court. See Top court rejects free-speech case, San Diego Union-
Tribune B3 (Oct 8, 1996). The Court has considered several related cases. In Cox v Louisi-
ana, 379 US 559, 563 (1965), the Court rejected a First Amendment challenge to a prose-
cution under a statute similar to the current 18 USC § 1507. The defendants crime was
leading a crowd of two thousand people across the street from a courthouse to protest the
arrest of twenty-three students the previous day. Id at 564-65. The Court explained that
although an individual act might not present a "clear and present danger to the admini-
stration of justice," the actions of a crowd might inherently threaten the judicial process.
Id at 566. The actions of a crowd might thus be subject to legislative restriction without
impinging the First Amendment. Id. See also Gentile v State Bar of Nevada, 501 US 1030,
104748 (1991) (holding that a defense attorney's press conference did not present a clear
and present danger to the judicial process and noting that because the comments were
made months before the trial, the chance of prejudice was slim); United States v Grace,
461 US 171, 177 (1983) (observing that the government may regulate the time, place, and
manner of speech as long as its regulations are content neutral, narrowly tailored, and
serve a significant government interest); Wood v Georgia, 370 US 375, 386-89 (1962)
(holding that a state may punish the publication of thoughts and opinions only if that
publication presents a "clear and present danger to administration of justice"); Bridges v
California, 314 US 252, 262-63 (1941) (applying a "clear and present danger" standard
and explaining that "the substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of im-
minence extremely high before utterances can be punished").
'See Wood v Georgia, 370 US 375, 398 (1962) (Harlan dissenting) ('That petitioner's
statement would tend to aid rather than to prejudice [defendants] was equally true in
Bridges but was rightly afforded no significance; the State as well as the individual is en-
titled to a day in court.") (citation omitted); id at 389 (majority opinion) (suggesting that a
government can protect against prejudice that "might result to one litigant or the other by
ill-considered misconduct aimed at influencing the outcome of a trial") (emphasis added).
See also Cox v Louisiana, 379 US 559, 564-66 (1965) (noting that the state may adopt
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Even if one believes that the jury's power to nullify is enshrined
in Article III, so that attempts by the community to influence ju-
rors are not only permissible but desirable, the ability of nullifi-
cation advocates to approach jurors cannot be absolute. No one
would argue, for example, that government is powerless to control
and punish attempts by defense sympathizers to bribe or
threaten jurors.
Advocates of nullification seem to suggest, however, that
speech concerning jury nullification should enjoy a specially
privileged status not shared by other speech directed at influ-
encing jury verdicts, a status that would exempt it from the
regulation to which other acquittal-friendly speech is subjected.'
The claim has at least superficial appeal. Because nullification
advocacy questions the authority of judges generally, judicial ef-
forts to suppress such speech may smack of political repression
and abuse of power. 7 The risk that judges will retaliate against
or stifle their critics warrants strict vigilance over efforts to con-
trol nullification advocacy." But conditioning permissible regula-
safeguards to exclude influence over criminal proceedings by either a hostile or a friendly
mob).
='See, for example, Turney, 936 P2d at 544 (noting claim of defendant Turney that the
state permits "one point of view to be expressed in the State Court and Office building, but
censor[s] the opposing point of view," exposing jurors to only one side of this debate).
'Former Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach summarized this distinction
between speech that is critical of government and speech that is not: "Where the govern-
ment itself is the object of criticism, the obligation to tolerate dissent, to make available
suitable public forums, and to refrain from even the appearance of repression is particu-
larly important. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Protest, Politics, and the First Amendment,
44 Tulane L Rev 439, 449 (1970).
'Strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard with which to review limitations on nulli-
fication advocacy for two additional reasons. First, most restraints on attempts to commu-
nicate with jurors are content-based. Obstruction and tampering statutes condemn only
those communications concerning jury service. See Burson v Freeman, 504 US 191, 197-
98, 217 (1992) (Four Justices who joined in the majority decision voted for strict scrutiny
of the campaign restrictions because of their content emphasis, and three dissenters
agreed with the application of that standard.). Second, the area where nullification advo-
cacy often takes place is arguably a public forum. Compare Lee v International Society for
Krishna Consciousness, Inc, 505 US 672, 678 (1992) (striking down a ban on distribution
of printed materials at an airport); Burson, 504 US at 196-97 (finding polling places to be
"quintessential public forums"); United States v Grace, 461 US 171, 180 (1983) (holding
that "[tihe public sidewalks forming the perimeter of the Supreme Court grounds ... are
public forums and should be treated as such for First Amendment purposes"), with United
States v Kokinda, 497 US 720, 727-30 (1990) (finding postal premises not to be public fo-
rums); Adderley v Florida, 385 US 39, 46-48 (1966) (rejecting claim that jailhouse grounds
are a public forum because the area was not normally used by the public); Pearson v
United States, 581 A2d 347, 352-55 (DC App 1990) (holding that Supreme Court plaza was
not a public forum). See also Edward J. Neveril, Comment, 'Objective' Approaches to the
Public Forum Doctrine: The First Amendment at the Mercy of Architectural Chicanery, 90
Nw U L Rev 1185, 1187-88 (1996) (noting that the Court's application of the public forum
doctrine has been "in a constant state of flux" for the past twenty years).
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tion upon a distinction between speech that urges prospective ju-
rors to disobey the law and all other speech is unworkable.' The
best approach is one that focuses on the degree of influence the
questioned speech may have on the jury's independence in finding
facts, not on the direction of that influencemo Time, place, and
manner restrictions on attempts to influence jurors offer suffi-
cient protections for nullification advocates and opponents alike.
Cases considering restrictions on access to voters or legisla-
tors offer some guidance for judges setting limits on nullification
advocacy. Although the First Amendment protects robust and
vigorous efforts to lobby and educate electors and legislators be-
fore popular and legislative votes are cast, it does not guarantee
the right to buttonhole a target up to the last moment. Reason-
able lobbying-free zones at the polling place or in the legislative
chamber permit decisionmakers the physical and intellectual
freedom they need to function without interference. As the court
explained in Burson v Freeman,"3 ' some radius providing deci-
'A somewhat similar distinction was dismissed nearly forty years ago when the
Court termed the intent of courthouse protestors to seek justice and not its obstruction "ir-
relevant" to the question of whether or not the First Amendment protected their speech.
See Cox, 379 US at 567 ("The fact that by their lights appellant and the 2,000 students
were seeking justice and not its obstruction is as irrelevant as would be the motives of the
mob condemned by Justice Holmes in Frank v. Magnum [237 US 309, 347 (1915) (Holmes
dissenting)].").
'Another neutral restraint on judicial efforts to punish nullification advocates is con-
tained in the mens rea requirement of most of the offenses with which advocates are
charged. Most require that a defendant be at least reckless about the effect of his speech
on a juror's decision. For instance, 18 USC § 1503 has been interpreted to prohibit acts
that the defendant could reasonably foresee "would have likely resulted in an obstruction
of justice." United States v Neiswender, 590 F2d 1269, 1273-74 (4th Cir 1979). See gener-
ally Joseph V. De Marco, Note, A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the Courthouse:
Mens Rea, Document Destruction, and the Federal Obstruction of Justice Statute, 67 NYU
L Rev 570 (1992) (discussing the dangers of the Neiswender approach).
Given this standard, nullification advocates might point to the content of their litera-
ture to deny that they desired to influence verdicts at all. Nothing in the FIJA pamphlet,
for example, focuses on particular cases, or on particular classes of cases. Instead, the
message of jury power is no more of an effort to sway any particular verdict than a vigor-
ous attack on a "three strikes" law, an argument supporting the legalization of drugs, or
an essay in favor of unanimous verdicts. However, when leafleters direct such general
pleas for reform to jurors on a particular case, intent to influence those jurors is fair to in-
fer. Compare Cox, 379 US at 567 ("At the very least, a group of demonstrators parading
and picketing before a courthouse where a criminal charge is pending, in protest against
the arrest of those charged, may be presumed to intend to influence judges, jurors, wit-
nesses or court officials."), with United States v Smith, 555 F2d 249, 250-51 (9th Cir 1977)
(reversing conviction of tax resister for criminal contempt after he had stated loudly in the
presence of a juror in the trial of another tax resister, "I hope this jury doesn't go along
with those communistic tax laws," because he spoke only with a willful and wanton disre-
gard of whether jurors might hear him, not knowingly and willfully).
23 504 US 191, 207-08 (1992) (holding that campaign workers can be barred from advo-
cacy within a campaign-free zone surrounding the polling place). Even if one agrees with
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sionmakers with a neutral thinking zone is consistent with free
speech principles. Nullification advocates urging jurors to con-
sider exercising their nullification power to defeat an unjust
prosecution should be subject to at least the same restraints as
are imposed upon campaign workers urging voters to exercise
their franchise to defeat an unjust initiative.
The timing of any effort to reach a juror or prospective juror
is perhaps the most important consideration when assessing the
legality of restraints. The government's interests in regulating
speech to jurors are more pressing when speech is directed at a
sitting juror. Jurors must be free to carry out their duties, once
empaneled, without the added burden of pressures from sources
outside the courtroom. Although jurors must be protected from
intimidation and influence while they are serving as jurors, they
must not be shielded, before they are called upon to serve, from
debate about the role of the jury and the decisions juries must
make. When the speech takes place before trial, voir dire and
changes of venue may cure any improper influence. Restraints on
the speaker become more necessary if the communication takes
place after voir dire." 2 Without submitting the information that
jurors receive to ordinary rules of procedure, there is no assur-
the dissenters in Burson that the restriction in that case was unconstitutionally severe,
some space providing voters with a neutral zone for decisionmaking is acceptable. See
House Rule XXXII, 105th Cong (1997) (limiting access to the Hall of the United States
House of Representatives); National Association of Social Workers v Harwood, 69 F3d 622,
636, 643-50 (1st Cir 1995) (Lynch dissenting) (addressing the First Amendment issue not
reached by the majority and arguing that a legislature may institute time, place, and
manner restrictions to preserve legislative independence, but a legislature may not ex-
clude some lobbyists while allowing others); Dan Harrie, House Bans Lobbyists from Floor,
Salt Lake Trib D1 (Jan 10, 1997) (reporting that after lobbyists had disrupted legislative
business by actually casting votes and whispering in legislators' ears, the Utah House of
Representatives adopted rule banning lobbyists from chamber, quoting the House Speaker
as stating that the rule was needed to eliminate confusion and to "establish an atmos-
phere more compatible to focusing our attention on the business of the session).
'See Gentile v State Bar of Nevada, 501 US 1030, 1054-58 (1991) (noting that be-
cause of voir dire and the possibility of a change of venue, "[o]nly the occasional case pres-
ents a danger of prejudice from pretrial publicity"). Compare Economy Carpets Manufac-
turers and Distributors, Inc v Better Business Bureau of Baton Rouge, 330 S2d 301, 307
(La 1976) (striking down an order restraining the parties from mailing literature or post-
ing signs regarding the litigation between them, noting that "[elven if... the utterances
tended to coerce prospective jurors exposed to them," the population of the vicinage was
large enough so that two small signs and one mailing did not threaten to influence jurors
during voir dire examination or the testimony of witnesses at the trial, or to in some other
way create prejudice in the public mind or undue influence for a party so as to prevent a
fair and impartial trial). See also United States v Bashaw, 982 F2d 168, 172-73 (6th Cir
1992) (reversing conviction of man who intimidated jurors after their service was complete
and noting that although "an individual need not succeed in obstructing justice to violate
section 1503, a defendant must at least undertake action 'from which an obstruction of
justice was a reasonably foreseeable result") (citation omitted).
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ance that what jurors hear is accurate or benign. Also, the public
may be more likely to believe that any given communication in-
fluenced, or was intended to influence, the verdict if the commu-
nication occurred after the jury was selected. For example, a tax
resister who attempts to supply a trial juror with nullification
pamphlets in order to influence her vote would not be able to
claim that a conviction for obstructing justice violated his right to
speak freely."
In addition to timing, the manner and location of speech will
affect its impact. Even after trial starts, some attempts to influ-
ence jurors are bound to be so ineffective that they do not justify
restraint. Attempts to influence verdicts are less likely to affect a
sitting juror, and are easier for the properly instructed juror to
avoid, if they are printed on a billboard or newspaper,' than if
they are worn on clothing by persons present at the trial. 5 For
example, several outspoken insurance companies once found
themselves facing a contempt citation after running advertise-
ments and distributing pamphlets nationwide that blamed jurors
for high insurance rates and urged readers to return verdicts
more favorable to insurance companies should they serve on ju-
riesY A federal court declined to punish the defendants, after
finding that the communications did not present that "extremely
high degree of imminence" of improper influence upon jurors that
the First Amendment required in order to ban public expres-
sionY The court reasoned that the widely disseminated adver-
tisements were directed against "no particular target-no par-
'Compare United States v Ogle, 613 F2d 233, 236 (10th Cir 1979) (upholding convic-
tion, under 18 USC § 1503, of tax resister who had contacted the friend of someone he rec-
ognized on the jury in a tax prosecution he had been watching, and had asked whether the
juror had a copy of a juror "handbook" which, among other things, advocated jury nullifi-
cation). Ogle did not raise a First Amendment challenge to his prosecution, but he did ar-
gue that his actions were not "corrupt" under the statute. The Court rejected his chal-
lenge, reasoning that the term "corrupt" is directed to any "effort to bring about a par-
ticular result such as affecting the verdict or the testimony of a witness." Id at 238-39.
"'See Gentile, 501 US at 1069 (noting that courts cannot "constitutionally punish,
through use of the contempt power, newspapers and others for publishing editorials, car-
toons, and other items critical ofjudges in particular cases").
See Ryan v Cronin, 191 Colo 487, 488-89, 553 P2d 754, 754-55 (1976) (describing or-
der by judge banning witnesses and defendant, who was charged with offenses arising
over a boycott of Gallo wines, from wearing buttons in the courtroom calling for the boy-
cott); Frankel v Roberts, 567 NYS2d 1018, 1020-21, 165 AD2d 382, 385-87 (NY App Div
1991) (rejecting contempt penalty for attorney who refused to remove "Ready to Strike"
button from lapel, reasoning that the "manner of expression was not basically incompati-
ble with the normal activity and operation of this courtroom devoid ofjurors or witnesses")
(emphasis added).
See Hoffman v Perrucei, 117 F Supp 38, 38-39 (E D Pa 1953).
2Id at 40.
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ticular law suit-but rather aimed at influencing the public mind
generally."'  Even more pointed efforts directed at jurors in par-
ticular cases could fail to justify restraint. Just as newspapers
may not be prevented from publishing accounts of evidence in-
admissible at trial or editorials advocating conviction in any give
case, nullification advocates should be free to publish direct en-
couragement to citizens selected as jurors to acquit against the
lawY9 The question is not whether the particular message is ac-
curate, or even lawful, but whether it poses a sufficiently high
risk of actually influencing juror behavior. 4 In short, those who
wish to influence jury deliberations and verdicts through the ad-
vocacy of jury nullification may be kept at a distance, even ex-
cluded, from the trial process itself.
=Id.
'In Wood v Georgia, 370 US 375, 394 (1962), the Court reversed the contempt convic-
tion of the county sheriff who had criticized in the local newspaper a local judge's special
instruction to a grand jury to investigate rumors of bloc voting by African-American vot-
ers. The Court reasoned that the communication did not create a clear and present danger
to the administration of justice. Id at 395. The Court noted that the case did not involve
any attempt to influence a trial jury. Id at 389-90. See also Abramson, We, the Jury at 58
(cited in note 5) (describing the controversy surrounding a newspaper advertisement urg-
ing jurors to acquit abortion protesters). Taking the message of nullification to television
or to the lecture hall is similarly unlikely to influence the outcome of a particular case. See
Turney, 936 P2d at 540-41 (rejecting claim that tampering statute reaches messages
broadcast to the general public on such topics as insurance fraud or the wisdom of tort re-
form, or advertisements run with the purpose of informing viewers about jury nullifica-
tion, as these messages lack a specific intention to influence how jurors decide a particular
case).
'For the same reason, a court may also find that while large groups of demonstrators
may warrant restriction of speech about nullification outside courthouses, a protester or
two may not, depending on where and how they demonstrate. Courts have applied this
reasoning to the broader issue of demonstrations near courthouses. Compare Grace, 461
US at 183 (holding unconstitutional a statute forbidding picketing and leafleting on side-
walks near court, and rejecting the argument that such demonstrations would create an
appearance of improper influence on the court), with Cox, 379 US at 583 (Black dissent-
ing) ("Justice cannot be rightly administered, nor are the lives and safety of prisoners se-
cure, where throngs of people clamor against the processes of justice right outside the
courthouse orjailhouse doors."). See also In re the Imprisonment ofE.H. Hennis, 6 NC App
683, 171 SE2d 211, 212, 215 (1969) (upholding contempt conviction of lone picketer with
sign calling for the impeachment of judge for "discrimination against members of my
white race" after persons in the courtroom went to windows to watch him picket, noting
that his conduct caused the proceedings of the court to be interrupted and "tended to im-
pair the respect due the court's authority"), revd, 276 NC 571, 173 SE2d 785, 787 (1970)
(finding lack of "willfulness").
Conceivably, the government's interest in preserving the appearance that jurors are
not influenced by outside pressure may warrant some limits on even unsuccessful at-
tempts to sway jurors through otherwise protected expressive activity, if those attempts
will undermine public confidence in the jury system. Compare Cox, 379 US at 565 (noting
the state interest in protecting against the appearance of judges being improperly influ-
enced by demonstrations). I do not advocate such restrictions here.
The University of Chicago Law Review
CONCLUSION
At first glance, the existing combination of rules regarding
the jury's ability to ignore its instructions has little coherence.
Why should the Constitution bar judges from correcting nullifica-
tion after it happens, but enable them to minimize its occurrence
beforehand? The privilege that jurors now enjoy to acquit for any
reason seems at odds with several judicial practices, including
the custom of carefully winnowing from the jury all those who
might take advantage of their veto power, and censoring those
who try to tell jurors that they have such power. Yet a hard look
at the Constitution for ammunition with which to defend the ad-
vocates of jury nullification against these repressive techniques
yields very little. Every theory that might prohibit judges from
suppressing pro-nullification advocacy misfires. Jury nullification
is not protected by the Constitution as an independent good, but
rather, is tolerated as a byproduct of the careful defense of other
fundamental values. The tolerance that jury nullification pres-
ently enjoys should not, and cannot without greater cost, be
transformed into a more robust afirmative grant of power.
